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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly acknowledged that upon presentation of 
a verbal item, a certain amount of information concerning 
the item is stored in memory for later utilization. This 
representation in memory is often referred to as a ''memory 
trace". 
Whereas few authors would disagree that the term 
"memory trace" refers to the memory of an individual event, 
the exact nature of the event's representation has been a 
continual point of argument. It would seem to be the case, 
however, that whatever its nature, a memory trace must 
represent different facets of experience surrounding an 
item's presentation. Thus, as an example, subjects may 
report the temporal aspects of an item's presentation 
(Hintzman & Block, 1971), the modality within which items 
are presented (Hintzman, Block & Inskeep, 1972), and the 
frequency with which items are presented (Underwood, 
Zimmerman & Freund, 1971). Hence, Underwood (1969), 
Wickens (1970) and others have suggested that the memory 
trace for a verbal event consists of a variety of different 
attributes or features that represent these varying facets 
of the psychological experience. The present report 
investigates the nature of the memorial information that 
enables subjects to specify the modality within which a 
verbal event has occurred. 
1 
2 
The Modality Attribute 
-
Wallach and Averbach (1955) noted that individuals 
may report the manner in which they recall information. 
Some, for instance, report that they recall words by sound, 
whereas others s tate that they r e c a 1 1 such i n for rna t ion i n 
script or print. These experiences, apparently shared by 
many individuals, simply testify to the fact that infor-
mation processing may occur through the various sensory 
modalities. With regard to verbal material, for instance, 
usually the auditory (A) or visual (V) modality is involved. 
Hence, it seemed reasonable to Wallach and Averbach that an 
experience of a verbal event in one modality may differ 
from the experience of that same event in another modality. 
Wallach and Averbach further argued that if this is indeed 
the case, then it would be 1 ikely that each type of exper-
ience results in a particular type of memory trace. 
The notion that verbal items presented in the A 
modality are coded in a different fashion from that of 
items presented in the V modality has been tested in a 
number of different paradigms. Most relevant for present 
purposes, however, are: (a) investigations demonstrating 
a release from proactive interference (PI) in short-term 
memory; and (b) experiments investigating the retention of 
modality information per~· 
Release from~ following shifts~ modality. 
Wickens (1970, 1972) has reported data from a number of 
experiments intended to uncover the possible dimensions 
along which verbal items may be encoded. The general 
technique employed in these investigations has been the 
short-term memory paradigm developed by Brown (1958) and 
Peterson and Peterson (1959). In the Brown-Peterson 
paradigm, subjects are first presented triads of verbal 
materials (words, letters, etc.). Following a period of 
distractor activity, usually lasting from 12 to 20 sec., 
recall is required. Performance is increasingly impaired 
within two orthree such trials due to the 11 build-up 11 of 
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PI (Keppel & Underwood, 1962). Wickens (1970) suggested 
that this build-up of PI is contingent upon the items in 
successive triads being encoded along the same dimension. 
Thus, if items on a later trial are somehow encoded differ-
ently from those presented on earlier trials, there should 
be little interference from the earlier presented items. 
The net effect of this shift in the encoding dimension 
should be to produce a recovery or 11 re1ease 11 from PI; 
performance should approximate that seen in the first few 
trials of the experiment when little PI is evident. 
If A and V items are encoded differently, a ••release•• 
effect should be obtained when the shift in the encoding 
dimension is from A to V or vice-versa. Hopkins, Edwards 
and Gavalek (1971) tested this prediction using anrmal 
names as stimulus items and visually presented arithmetic 
problems as the distractor material; These authors found 
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that although a 11 release 11 effect was obtained when the 
shift trial was in the A modality and the preceeding trials 
were in the V modality, the complementary effect, obtaining 
a PI release when the shift trial was in the V modality 
and the preceeding trials were in the A modality, was not 
evident in the data. Such a result is not consistent with 
the expectation outlined above. That is, if modality is 
an encoded dimension of memory, a release effect would be 
expected whenever the shift trial comprised a presentation 
in a modality different from that employed in previous 
trials. 
Hopkins, Edwards and Cook (1973, Experiment II) 
demonstrated that the previous inconclusive results 
regarding modality shifts were due to the fact that the 
distractor problems were always presented in the V modality. 
In particular, these authors showed that a release from PI 
would results whenever material presented on the shift 
trial was in a modality different from both the modality 
within which previous items had been presented and the 
modality within which the interpolated task was presented. 
That is, a release from PI was obtained when both the 
to-be-remembered material and the distractor material were 
presented in a different modality than the material 
presented in the release trial. 
Kroll, Bee and Gurski (1973) suggested another 
reason for the failure of Hopkins et al. (1973) to obtain 
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a release effect when shifting from the A to the V modality. 
In particular, they argued that subjects may not have had 
sufficient incentive to encode V items in a fashion iso-
morphic with their presentation modality. Kroll et al ., 
by having subjects repeat aloud (i.e., shadow) a series of 
spoken letters as the distractor activity, were able to 
demonstrate the predicted release from PI. The authors 
pointed out that a presentation of an item in a given 
modality may not result in subsequent encoding by subjects 
in a fashion consistent with the presentation modality. 
Further, they noted that this difficulty may not always be 
of equal importance for presentation in the A as the V 
modality. In particular, it was suggested that subjects 
will often use some form of acoustic or auditory coding 
even when the items are presented visually. The importance 
of this suggestion with regard to the retention of modality 
information will be discussed in a later section of the 
present paper. 
The retention of modality information. Recent 
evidence indicates that subjects are able to maintain a 
discrimination between modalities over several minutes. 
The general procedure in these experiments has been to 
present subjects with a 1 ist of items, half in the A 
modality, and half in the V modality. Following 1 i·st 
presentation, subjects are given either a paced or unpaced 
test comprised of the items previously piesented on the 
study list ( 11old 11 items), and items not presented on the 
study 1 i s t ( 11 new 11 i t ems ) • The sub j e c t s a r e s u b seq u en t I y 
required to make a decision as to whether each item was 
presented in the V modality, the A modality, or was not 
presented (NP) on the study I ist. Two measures of perfor-
mance are of interest: (a) the probability of a correct 
modality judgment; and (b) the probability of a correct 
modality judgment conditional upon item recognition. The 
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latter measure supposedly takes into account the possibility 
that recognition performance may not be equal for A and 
V it ems . 
Bray and Batchelder (1972) employed the above 
procedure while manipulating retention interval (either 
an immediate test or a test following a 15 min. delay) 
and providing either intentional or incidental instructions 
regarding the later test for modality information. Prior 
to the modality identification task (MI), subjects recalled 
as many items as they could from the 30 item study 1 ist. 
With respect to the Ml task, probabi 1 ity correct modality 
judgments were above chance for both the A and V modalities. 
There were no significant effects of either retention 
interval or instructions. There was, however, a significant 
interaction between modality and retention interval such 
that Ml performance for V items increased over the 15 min. 
retention interval whereas Ml performance for A items did 
not. When using the conditional measure of performance, 
,-. 
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although A items were correctly identified more often than 
v items, the interaction of modality with retention interval 
was not significant. Again, there was no effect of in-
tentional versus incidental tasks. 
Hintzman, Block and Inskeep (1972, Experiment I) 
presented subjects eight word-lists, each list consisting 
of 18 items presented one time each. Following presenta-
tion of each 1 ist, subjects free-recalled as many items 
as possible. After recall of the last list, subjects were 
presented the 144 items from the eight 1 ists in addition 
to 16 NP items. The same type of Ml task as used by Bray 
and Batchelder was employed except that test items were 
also presented in either the A or V modality. Similar to 
the results obtained by Bray and Batchelder, Hintzman 
et al. (1972) found that subjects were able to discriminate 
A from V items at a level exceeding chance. Further, 
subjects were more accurate in discriminating modalities 
for words they had recalled previously than for those that 
had not been recalled. This latter result, however, was 
due to the fact that recalled V items were identified as 
having been presented in the V modality with greater prob-
ability than non-recalled V items. There were no sig-
nificant effects due to the modality within which an item 
was tested. 
In two other experiments, designed to measure retention 
of information within modalities, Hintzman et a1. (1972) 
found that subjects were also able to discriminate on a 
retention test between items that had been presented .in 
upper-case block letters from items presented in lower-
case script letters (Experiment II), and between items 
presented in a female voice and those presented in a male 
voide (Experiment Ill). The latter effect has been con-
firmed by Light, Stansbury, Rubin and Linde (1973). 
Several experiments have demonstrated that subjects 
are also able to distinguish between items presented twice 
in the same modality from those presented twice but in two 
modalities. Madigan and Doherty (1972) presented subjects 
with a study list where items were presented either once 
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in the A modality, once in the V modality, twice in either 
the A or V modality (AA and VV items), or once in each 
modality (AV and VA items). Following present.ation of the 
study 1 ist, subjects free-recalled the items and also 
indicated the mode in which each recalled item was present-
ed in the study 1 ist. ·The subjects made accurate judg-
ments of not only how many times an item had been presented 
in a given modality, but also the ordering of the modalities. 
That is, subjects. were able to remember that an A presen-
tation preceeded a V presentation and vice-versa, and 
were able to discriminate these mixed modality items from 
items that had been presented either once or twice in a 
single modality. Similar results have been obtained by 
Macey and Zechmeister (1973) when testing memory for 
modality following item recall, and by Hintzman, Block 
and Summers (1973) when testing memory for modality 
immediately following study. 
In sum, the results of the experiments reported 
above indicate that subjects do, in fact, retain a great 
deal of information concerning the manner in which to-be-
remembered ·items were presented for study. Further, 
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subjects are able to retain such information without special 
instructions concerning the nature of the memory test. 
With respect to a modality attribute, the results reviewed 
above provide strong evidence that modality is an encoded 
dimension of memory. However, the manner in which modality 
may be represented in memory remains a topic for further 
discussion. 
CHAPTER I I 
THE REPRESENTATION OF MODALITY INFORMATION 
It is clear that subjects are able to discriminate 
between A and V items at the time of a memory test when 
this information is required within 15 min. of the study 
trial. The manner in which modality information is repre-
sented in memory over this period of time, however, is not 
clear. Specifically, either of two general hypotheses 
can account for subjects• ability to report the modality 
within which an item was presented for study. One hypo-
thesis suggests that memory for modality is the result of 
retrieval of information from an abstract code that is 
merely a description of the circumstances, including the 
modality in which the item was presented, surrounding an 
item presentation. A second hypothesis suggests that 
memory for modality is the result of retrieval of the 
information contained in a physical code that for present 
purposes may be 1 ikened to an auditory or visual image. 
The remainder of the present chapter will be concerned 
with distinctions between these two hypotheses. 
The distinction between the two hypotheses outlined 
above can best be drawn by distinguishing two classes of 
general theories of human memory. One current class of 
theories emphasizes differences between various memory 
stores (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Norman, 1968). 
Generally speaking, these theories suggest that an item 
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is first represented in a sensory memory, according to 
whether the item was presented visually (iconic memory, 
cf. Neisser, 1967), or auditorily (pre-categorical acoustic 
storage, cf. Crowder & Morton, 1969). It is assumed that 
all information from the sensory memory stores is lost 
within a very short period, at most several seconds. In 
order that information might be retained for periods of 
time longer than several seconds, it has been suggested 
that items enter a short-term store or primary memory 
which is fundamentally 11 auditory-verbal 11 (Shiffrin, 1970) 
in terms of the nature of the stored information. Decay 
from the short-term store is seen as being relatively 
rapid unless the item is actively rehearsed. Hence, it 
has become useful to term the short-term store as a 
11 working memory•• (Sperling, 1967). Information to be 
retained over longer periods of time is assumed to be trans-
ferred to a long-term store through rehearsal processes. 
The rate of decay of information in the long-term store 
is assumed to be negligible. 
A critical feature of multi-store theories is the 
assumption that sensory features of the item presentation 
are low within a short period of time. A mechanism that 
might account for memory for modality is not, therefore, 
immediately obvious. At the same time, however, it has 
been suggested (shiffrin, 1970) that the long-term store 
can be considered to be organized a~cordlng to modality. 
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Hence, it may be the case that modality judgments are the 
result of subjects knowing the organizational principle by 
which an item in question is stored in memory. Further, 
as such an organizational principle could itself be con-
sidered to be of an 11 abstract 11 nature, it could be argued 
that modality information is represented in memory as an 
abstract proposition or principle representative of a 
certain class of items. 
Various viewpoints similar to the conceptualization 
discussed above have been presented in the 1 iterature. 
Murdock (1968), for example, has suggested that A and V 
items each enter a different short-term store from which 
information is transferred to long-term memory. If this is 
the case, it could be that the resultant trace in the long-
term store contains information concerning from which short-
term store the item was transferred. Ultimately, such 
information could be used as the basis for modality judge-
ments (cf. Underwood, 1969). 
As an alternative to the multi-store conceptualization, 
Craik and Lockhart,(1972) have suggested that items may be 
characterized as being represented in memory at any one of 
a number of different levels of processing. According to 
the authors, the different levels of processing may In 
turn be characterized as being synonymous with different 
features of the item, and with different rates of forgetting. 
For example, semantic features are seen by the authors as 
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conducive to long-term retention with a rather slow rate of 
forgetting, whereas acoustic characteristics of the item 
are seen as susceptible to greater decay, and hence are 
viewed as being synonymous with faster rates of forgetting. 
Similarly, Posner and Warren (1972) have suggested 
that an item may be represented in memory by a number of 
different codes, some of these pertaining to the physical 
properties of the item presentation with others relating to 
the phonemic and semantic properties of the item. Accord-
ing to the authors, all of these codes may simultaneously 
represent the item in memory. Performance in a given task, 
however, may depend upon the retention of a particular type 
of code, and the authors point out that by maintaining this 
particular type of code in memory, the retention of other 
codes may suffer. Within the conceptualizations offered 
by Craik and Lockhart (1972) and Posner and Warren (1972), 
then, it may be the case that performance on a modality 
judgment task is contingent upon retrieving the physical 
code or that part of the memory that represents the physical 
features of the item as originally presented. 
Each class of theories presented above thus suggests 
an alternative hypothesis with respect to the nature of the 
modality representation in memory. One hypothesis suggests 
that upon presentation of an item, the subject takes notice 
of the modality, and this experience is subsequently stored 
in conjunction with other aspects or attributes of that item. 
This hypothesis does not delimit the stage in information 
processing at which the information is abstracted. The 
second hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that, upon 
presentation of an item, a memory trace analogous to a 
physical code or image is stored in memory, the infor-
mation available in such a code serving to later identify 
input modality (Hintzman, Block & Inskeep, 1972). 
Modality~ ''context". Anderson and Bower (1972) 
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have suggested that the various aspects of item presentat-
ions, such as 11 ••• where in space the item was presented, 
who said it, how it was said, and other special character-
istics of its physical and psychological presentation (p.99)" 
become associated with the members of the subjec's lexicon 
and thus serve as "markers" which enable subjects to dis-
tinguish between items presented on the list from those 
that were not presented. 
Anderson and Bower's model has a considerable amount 
of intuitive appeal, since it is clear that the items em-
ployed in the typical memory experiment are already known 
to the subjects. It is the subject's task to discriminate 
between items presented on the study 1 ist from other members 
of his vocabulary and then retrieve these items. What is 
important for present purposes, however, is that these 
models suggest that the information which enables the sub-
ject to discriminate "old" from "new" items is of an ab-
stract nature. Thus, Anderson and Bower state: 
1 5 
Upon presentation of a word in study, we assume that 
the sensory features of that word activate the node in 
the (memory} network that corresponds to the word. 
Simultaneously, there are active in the network nodes 
corresponding to the various contextual stimuli that 
the subject is attending to. (p. 103) 
Bower (1972) further states: 
1 think of this psychological context as being produced 
by the free flow of the "stream of consciousness'', the 
internal monologue as the subject describes to himself 
what is going on around him, and comments upon or free 
associates his descriptions. (p. 93) 
These "marker" theories of discriminative memory 
suggest that the subject's ability to report the modality 
within which an item is presented for study is contingent 
upon retrieval of the stored "contextual" information, 
which is abstract or propositional in nature. 
Modality~ represented~ physical codes. It is 
clear that judgments concerning the physical properties of 
an item presentation do not constitute evidence for either 
the abstract code or the physical code hypothesis. If the 
physical code is to be I ikened to some sort of mental image 
or "literal copy" of the original stimulus presentation, 
however, then it is necessary to demonstrate that the 
physical attributes of the stimulus as remembered are iso-
morphic with the physical properties of the stimulus as 
perceived. Put in other terms, it is important to deter-
mine whether the internal representation of a memorial 
image is analogous to the internal representation of a 
typical perception. Thus, the question here concerns the 
nature of the proposed image rather than the function of 
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the image (Cooper & Shepard, 1973). 
One major method has been utilized to demonstrate 
the existence of a visual code that can be likened to a 
visual image. This method has dealt with the selective 
facilitation of reaction times when the stimulus as 
remembered is within the same format as the test stimulus. 
Posner, Boies, Eichelman and Taylor (1969) suggested that 
when subjects are required to respond whether or not two 
letters are the same, the time to make such a response 
will reflect the type of information required to make a 
"match''. This suggestion was based on the assumption 
that, if the physical aspects of a letter are in storage 
at the time of test, subjects' reaction times would be 
faster when the letter in memory and the test letter were 
in the same case than when the memory letter was in the 
upper-case the test letter was in the lower-case or vice-
versa. That is, a relatively faster match would be expect-
ed when both letters are physically identical and no 
11 name 11 code is required for comparison than when letters 
are physically different and subjects would have to go 
through a process of generating a code which represents 
the name of the letter before making the required comparison. 
The authors found results confirming this expectation. It 
should be noted, however, that the relative efficiency of 
the physical match over the name match decreased over the 
period of 2 sec. 
In a similar experiment, Parks, Kroll, Salzberg 
and Parkinson (1972) found that the greater efficiency of 
a nominally defined physical match was evident over a 
period of at least 8 sec. provided that subjects were 
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given some incentive to code visual items in a manner that 
was isomorphic with their presentation. This was accom-
plished in their study by having subjects engage in an 
auditory shadowing task prior to and following presentation 
of the memory letter. In addition to finding the same 
degree of relative efficiency in terms of mean response 
time (RT) as did Posner et al. (1969), the greater retention 
interval employed yielded sufficient data in terms of 
errors to demonstrate that subjects made fewer errors in 
matching when both the memory and the test letter were in 
the same case. 
Unfortunately, since the relative efficiency of the 
physical code comparison over the name code comparison was 
found to be evident only over an 8 sec. period, it is 
difficult to argue that subjects employ the information 
available in a physical code in making modality judgments 
after 15 min. However, as Posner et al. (1969) state: 
It is difficult, however, to say whether this loss in 
relative advantage of a physical match corresponds 
closely with loss in the ability to state whether the 
letter was upper- or lower-case. It is possible that 
subjects who show no faster reaction time for physical 
than name identity would be able to recall better 
than chance the case of the letter. Indeed, the infor-
mation required from the visual representation for a 
fast RT might be greater than would be required in order 
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to tell whether the letter is upper-case or lower-case. 
It is conceivable that a very seriously decayed visual 
representation would still be sufficient, given un-
limited time, for subjects to retrieve information con-
cerning the case of the letter (p. 14, italics added). 
If the Posner et al. (1969) assumption is correct, then it 
should be the case that given a retention interval of 
several minutes, subjects should still be able to report 
whether visually presented verbal items were presented in 
upper- or lower-case letters. As was mentioned above, 
however, the abi 1 ity to report presentation modality does 
not distinguish between alternative hypotheses concerning 
the nature of the modality representation. 
Hintzman, Block and Inskeep (1972) argued that if 
the information available in a physical code does play an 
important role in item retrieval, then subjects should be 
more accurate in recognition decisions when study and test 
items are presented in the same physical format than when 
the study and test items differ along some physical dimen-
sion. To test this hypothesis, the authors (Experiment I I) 
presented subjects with a 1 ist of items in which half of 
the items were presented in large upper-case block letters 
and half were presented in small lower-case script letters. 
The test procedure employed was similar to that used in 
the modality identification task outlined earlier. Spec if-
ically, half of the subjects were presented the test items 
in upper-case block letters, whereas the remaining half of 
the subjects were presented the test items in lower-case 
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script letters. As predicted, subjects were more accurate 
in recognizing test items when the items were present·ed in 
the same physical format as they had been presented in the 
study 1 ist. 
In a replication of the Hintzman et al. (1972, 
Experiment II) experiment, Hintzman and Summers (1973) 
found similar results with respect to recognition perform-
ance and also showed that subjects' reaction times were 
faster when study and test item representations were in 
the same physical format than when they were not. Similarly, 
Kirsner (1974) found that subjects' recognition decisions 
were faster and more accurate when items were presented 
auditorily or visually on both occasions than when they 
were presented in different modes on the two occasions. 
It may be noted that the results obtained by Kirsner (1974) 
and Hintzman and Summers are similar to those of Parks 
et al. (1972) and Posner et al. (1969) who investigated the 
retention of physical codes of single letters only over 
brief retention intervals. 
While the evidence presented thus far is rather 
com p e 1 1 i n g w i t h res p e c t to the rna i n ten an c e of v i s u a 1 and 
auditory information in a literal format, the results of 
several of these studies remains equivocal. In particular, 
while Kirsner (1974) and Hintzman, Block and Inskeep (1972) 
found evidence for selective facilitation in recognition 
performance when items were presented in the same physical 
format on both study and test occasions, this pattern of 
results was not evident for modality judgments taken. 
conditional upon item recognition. Thus, if modality 
judgments are to be postulated as being the result of 
retrieval of information available in a code that is a 
111 iteral 11 copy of the original stimulus presentation, the 
evidence remains unclear. The remainder of the present 
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paper, then, deals with the nature of representation issue. 
CHAPTER I I I 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE RETENTION OF MODALITY CODES 
The data reviewed in the previous chapters are 
inconclusive regarding the manner in which the information 
utilized by subjects in making modality judgments is rep-
resented in memory. However, if modality information is 
represented in terms of physical codes, it is of some im-
portance to study the retention of auditory and visual codes 
independently. It may be the case, for example, that 
auditory and visual codes have different characteristics 
of decay and/or are susceptible to different types of 
interference. Unfortunately, previous experiments inves-
tigating the retention of modality information are not 
suitable for the independent evaluation of auditory and 
visual.modality codes. 
The reader may remember that the modality identi-
fication task used by Bray and Batchelder (1972) and 
Hintzman, Block and Inskeep (1972) consisted of having 
subjects classify each test item as to whether it was pre-
sented in the V mode, the A mode, or was not presented (NP) 
on the study 1 ist. It is possible in such a design that 
subjects choose between the three classifications by means 
of a two stage decision process. Specifically, s-ubjects 
may first decide as to whether the item was or was not 
presented on the study list on the basis of some type of 
information not relevant to judgment of modality. It this 
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is the ease, t~en the subject•s next task is to decide 
whether the item was presented in the A or V mode. Con-
ceivably, subjects could do so on the basis of the presence 
or absence of a particular type of modality code. Thus, 
for example, if subjects encode only A items in a manner 
isomorphic with presentation modality, subjects could 
determine whether or not an item was presented in the A 
modality on the basis of retrieving the A code for the test 
item. If an A code were available in memory, the subject 
would choose the A classification; if an A code were not 
available, the subject would choose the V classification. 
Hence, it would not be necessary for subjects to retain 
modality information for V presented items. Conversely, 
it could be the case that subjects choose among the three 
test classifications on the basis of an attribute appro-
priate to recognition decisions and the presence or absence 
of a visual code. 
An alternative to the above description of subjects• 
decision processes is that subjects• recognition decisions 
are not independent of modality judgments. Specifically, 
subjects• willingness to accept an item as having been 
presented on the study 1 ist may be dependent upon the know-
ledge the subject has concerning the modality in which an 
item was presented. Thus, if a subject does not know the 
modality an old item was presented in, he may be more 
willing to say that the item was not presented. To the 
extent that modality information is differentially avail-
able for A and V items, such a decision bias might mask 
differential performance on a modality judgment task for 
A and V items. 
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The interpretive difficulties outlined above suggest 
that several considerations be kept in mind. First, it is 
desirable to separate the recognition aspects of the pro-
cedure from the modality judgment task. Second, it is 
necessary that the retention of A and V codes be measured 
independently and in such a fashion that the dominance of 
a given modality can be apparent. The influence of each 
of these considerations may now be outlined in terms of 
the particular test procedure employed in the present 
experiments. 
The general procedure. Each subject in Experiments 
I and II was presented a study 1 ist where half of the items 
were presented in the A mode and half were presented in 
the V mode. Following presentation of the study 1 ist, a 
test booklet was given to the subjects which was composed 
of pairs of items printed in one column, the letter 11 A11 or 
11 V11 printed in a second column, the words ''yes'' and "no" 
printed in a third column, and the numbers one through 
five printed in a fourth column. The pairs of words pre-
sented in the first column were obtained by pairing each 
word that had been presented in the study 1 ist with an item 
not previously seen by the subjects. in tlie experiment. 
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The subjects were informed that only one word from 
each pair actually had been presented in the study li.st. 
The subjects were then instructed to: (a) circle the word 
they felt was presented on the study list; (b) circle ••yes•• 
or 11 no 11 with respect to whether they felt the item thus 
chosen from the pair was presented in the modality question-
ed in the second column (A or V); and (c) indicate their 
confidence in their 11 yes/no•• decision by circling one of 
the five numbers (1-low, 5-high). The reasoning behind 
this choice of procedure with respect to the difficulties 
inherent in previously used designs is as follows. 
First, it should be apparent that by having subjects 
make their recognition decisions prior to making modality 
judgments, the temporal confounding of the two tasks in-
herent in other designs is avoided. Since su~jects are 
forced to choose that item which is most fami 1 iar to them, 
there can be no bias to reject an item as having been pres-
ented on the study 1 ist due to a lack of knowledge con-
cerning modality of presentation. 
Second, the use of the yes/no procedure to measure 
memory for modality instead of the modality classification 
procedure as employed in previous studies allows for the 
possibility that subjects might feel that a given item was 
not presented in one modality while at the same time not 
being wi 11 ing to say that it was presented in the other 
modality. This procedure allows for the possibility that 
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the information available to a subject might be sufficient 
to reject that an item was in one modality while at the 
same time allowing the further possibility that the same 
information might not be sufficient to determine whether 
the item was presented in the other modality. Put in other 
terms, the measurement of subjects' willingness to say that 
an item was presented in the A modality, for example, is 
independent of the measurement of subjects' willingness 
to say that the same item was presented in the V modality 
or vice-versa. It should be noted that this procedure does 
not circumvent the possibility that subjects might employ 
only one type of modality information in making decisions 
concerning both modalities. Rather, it ensures that the 
measurement of responses made to questioning concerning 
one modality is independent of the measurement of responses 
concerning the other modality. 
The Measurement £t Modality 
Given that differences between memory for the two 
modalities might exist, it is necessary that appropriate 
measures be available for uncovering such differences. 
The design as outlined thus far circumvents only part of 
the problem. The remaining difficulty to be dealt with 
is the manner in which individual subject's response biases 
are to be handled. It is necessary to determine, in some 
fashion, whether any effects that might be apparent. in the 
data are truly the result of differences between memory 
for the two modalities and not due to differences in re-
sponse biases toward one modality or the other. 
Typically, those experimenters concerned with the 
problem of response bias have resorted to one of several 
means to handle the problem. Perhaps most prevalent has 
been the use of the measures of the theory of signal 
detection (TSD; Green & Swets, 1966) to obviate any 
difficulties. One of the significant tenets of TSD is 
that a consideration of sensory discrimination should be 
made separately of considerations of response bias. The 
TSD measures of discrimination and bias (d' and Beta 
respectively), have direct analogs in the present design. 
Specifically, analogous to the probability of a "hit" in 
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TSD is the probability of correctly identifying the modality 
as questioned. Thus, an "auditory hit" can be classified 
as the probability of correctly identifying an item as 
having been presented in the A modality when questioned 
about the A modality. A "visual'' hit rate can be determined 
by calculating the probability of a subject correctly 
classifying a V item as having been presented in the V 
modality when questioned about the V modality. Thus, 
as in signal detection theory, "hits" may be identified 
as "correct" identifications associated with ''yes" responses. 
Similar procedures can be employed to determine the 
probability of an A or V "false alarm". The probability 
o f r e s p on d in g 11 yes 11 w h en a s ked w h e t h e r a v i s· u a 1 i t em w a s 
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presented auditorily, for instance, can be used to determine 
an A false alarm rate, while the probability of responding 
"yes" when asked whether an A item was presented visually 
can be used to determine a V false alarm rate. Given these 
measures, the A and V hit and false alarm rates respectively, 
it is then possible to derived' for each modality. 
One difficulty with this conceptualization is that 
any difference between modalities in terms of the d' measure 
is confounded with presentation modality. That is, .5!_' for 
the A modality is determined on the basis of classification 
of both A and V i terns, and hence, it is necessary to assume 
that a subject's response to a query concerning a given 
modality is the result of his checking his memory only 
for information concerning that modality. As was mentioned 
earlier, however, while the present method assures in-
dependence of measurement, it is not possible to specify 
the type of information utilized by subjects in making 
decisions concerning a specific modality. 
An alternative to the d' analysis is to treat 
modality of presentation and type of error (Miss vs. 
False Alarm) as main effects in an Analysis of Variance 
while using the probability of an error as the dependent 
variable. That is, there are two types of errors that a 
subject may make. One involves incorrect modality judg-
ments when a "yes" response is appropriate (following the 
terminology of TSD, hereafter terme9 a "Miss" or M). The 
J. 
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other type of error involves responding ••yes" when "no" is 
app-ropriate (a "false alarm" or FA). A difference in the 
type of error which is consistent across subjects would 
thus be indicative of any particular bias; a bias to 
respond "yes" would be demonstrated if the probability of 
a FA exceeds the probability of aM, whereas a bias to 
respond "no" would be apparent in a greater M than FA rate. 
This suggested analysis is similar in some respects 
to one recently proposed by Underwood (1974) who suggested 
that the relative difference between the two types of errors, 
i.e., (M- FA)/(M +FA), is highly correlated with the 
TSD measure Beta. This,· of course, would be expected if 
the relative difference between the two error rates does, 
in fact, reflect criterion differences. 
Thus, on the surface, the above mentioned form of 
analysis has at least some degree of intuitive appeal in 
that criterion or response bias differences may be treated 
independently of sensitivity differences or main effects. 
At the same t i me , however , the r e i s one f 1 a w i n the pro-
posed design that may not be readily apparent. Specifi-
cally, any interaction between error type (M versus FA) 
with the modality questioned (A or V) is confounded with 
the m a i n effect of present at ion mod a 1 i t y. Thus, FA's 
and M's are made in response to different questions con-
cerning modality of presentation. Clearly, therefore, 
any differential response bias in the tendency for a given 
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subject to believe that items were presented in any one 
specific modality might either mask, or unduly bias, .an 
interpretation that a difference between the modalities 
indeed exists. 
One possible means to overcome this difficulty 
would be to derive some measure of modality bias that would 
be independent of any true differences between the modal-
ities. One possible measure would be to compute the 
relative difference between the M and FA rates as analyzed 
separately by each modality questioned. Such a measure 
would be indicative of both a subject's bias to say "yes'' 
or 11 no 11 as well as the subject's bias to guess "auditory" 
or 11 vis~al 11 • The difference between the relative bias 
measure computed for any given modality and an overall 
bias measure, however, would yield some indication of 
bias to respond A as opposed to V. As shall be pointed 
out in later sections of the present paper, there are 
several behavioral consequences of this model of response 
bias measurement that may be directly tested in the data. 
Further specification of the measurements employed in the 
present experiments shall therefore be delayed until 
presentation of the appropriate results. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT I 
The first experiment is concerned with the retention 
of modality information as a function of the modality of 
an interpolated task and the nature of the instructions 
given to subjects prior to presentation of the study 1 ist. 
The theoretical expectations and specifics of the experi-
ment follow. 
A series of studies by Segal and her associates 
(Segal & Gordon, 1969; Segal & Fusella, 1970) demonstrated 
that the act of generating an image in a specific modality 
interferes with the perception of signals presented in that 
modality. Thus, Cooper and Shepard (1973) argued that 
image formation utilizes much of the same information pro-
c e s s i n g m a c h i n e r y t h a t i s u s e d i n t h e a c t o f p.e r c e p t i o n . 
Atwood (1971), dealing with material that subjects were 
required to remember rather than merely "detect", found 
similar results. Specifically, Atwood found that a visual 
distractor task engaged in by subjects during the learning 
of a paired-associate task reduced recall of high-imagery 
material but had less of an effect on highly abstract 
material. The implication of Atwood's results is that the 
formation of mnemonic images while engaging in a visual 
distractor task was difficult due to the shared information 
processing machinery required in both tasks. 
Evidence reviewed earlier (Kroll, Bee & Gurski, 1973; 
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Hopkins, Edwards & Cook, 1973) suggested that whether or 
not subjects retain visual information for an item is. 
dependent upon the nature of the task. Specifically, these 
studies demonstrated that a release from proactive inter-
ference (PI) in the Brown-Peterson paradigm following a 
change in input modality is contingent upon the modality 
in which the distractor material is presented. In both 
studies, a release from PI following a shift from A to V 
presentations of the to-be-remembered items was evident 
only when the distractor material was presented in the 
A modality. The imp] ication of these results is that the 
nature of the modality of the distractor material as well 
as the modality within which the to-be-remembered material 
is presented determines the nature of the item encodings. 
These results can be further related tQ those ob-
tained by Parkinson, Parks and Kroll (1971), and Parkinson 
(1972) who presented subjects with a 1 ist of to-be-remem-
bered letters embedded in a I ist of auditorily presented 
shadow material. These authors found that to-be-remembered 
V letters were recalled better than to-be-remembered A 
letters, and that interference in terms of phonemically 
similar shadowed letters was found to affect recall only 
for the A letters. These results suggest that whether or 
not subjects either encode and/or retain the physical 
properties of V letters appears to be contingent upon the 
modality of the interfering task. In particular, these 
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results suggest that subjects selectively rehearse and store 
visual properties of to-be-remembered material only when it 
is of some value to do so; interference between distractor 
material and to-be-remembered material is minimized by 
processing in different modalities. 
The findings reviewed above have implications for 
the study of memory for input modality. In particular, if 
modality information is stored in memory in terms of physical 
codes akin to mental 11 images 11 , memory for modality should be 
contingent upon the modality in which interpolated distractor 
material is presented. Consider, for example, a task where 
between item presentations, distractor material is presented 
either in the A or V modality. Under conditions of audito-
rily presented interpolated material, memory for the physical 
codes of V items should be enhanced relative to when the 
interpolated materials are presented in the V modality. 
The opposite pattern of results should be expected for audi-
torily presented items. If, on the other hand, modality is 
represented in memory in terms of abstract codes, 1 ittle 
difference should be apparent between the two types of 
interpolated materials. The above reasoning is based on 
the fact that the interference from the interpolated 
material would not be expected to differentially affect 
the abstract codes representing the two types of items. 
To test these implications, subjects in the present 
experiment were divided into three groups as defined by the 
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presence or absence of an interpolated task. One group of 
subjects simply viewed the study 1 ist as presented whereas 
the remaining groups solved simple arithmetic problems 
between presentations of to-be-remembered items in the 
study 1 ist. Of these latter groups, one group was presented 
the arithmetic problems in the A modality while the remain-
ing group was presented the distractor problems in the V 
modality. 
One further variable was manipulated in the present 
experiment. Specifically, one-half of the subjects were 
instructed as to the nature of the modality judgment task 
prior to the presentation of the study 1 ist, while the 
remaining half of the subjects were only instructed that 
their memory for the words would be tested. As reviewed 
earlier, Bray and Batchelder (1972) found no difference 
between two groups of subjects instructed in this manner. 
As was also noted earlier, however, the results of that 
study are suspect due to the lack of independence between 
A and V judgments~ The present study may thus be viewed 
as an attempt to replicate the Bray and Batchelder results. 
If instructions to remember modality have no effect 
on memory for modality, it may be assumed that modality 
codes are automatically established as part of a memory for 
a verbal item. If, on the other hand, there is an effect 
of instructions, it may be suggested that 
modality in.formation is a subject-control 
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latter position is in 1 ine with the Posner and Warren (1972) 
suggestion that the physical code for an item is one of a 
number of codes that must be actively rehearsed at the 
expense of other memory codes in order to become established 
in long term memory. 
Although the present experiment associates the null 
hypothesis with the abstract or propositional code hypo-
thesis, the present design permits a quantitative evaluation 
of the model outlined by Anderson and Bower (1972). As 
was described earlier, Anderson and Bower term their model 
"associative" in nature. Essentially, with respect to the 
present task, the model suggests that the probability of 
the modality of a given item being remembered is a function 
of the probability of the ••context 11 being established at a 
unique 11 node 11 in memory and the probability that the infer-
mation thus established is associated with a memory node 
representative of that item•s lexical properties in memory. 
It is thus assumed that upon presentation of an item at the 
time of test, encoding processes make for automatic access 
to that item•s lexical node. The probability of a 11 correct 11 
decision regarding the status of that item as being 11 old 11 
or ••new••, 11 auditory 11 or 11 visual 11 is thus dependent upon: 
(a) the probability that an association was estab.lished at· 
the time of study between the memory node representing the 
lexical properties of the item and the memory node repre-
senting the collective evidence (i.e., the abstract propo-
it -
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sitions regarding the nature of the item's presentation); 
and (b) the a moun t of e v i den c e, or the number of pro p.o s i t ions 
in memory that would permit such a decision to be made. 
More formally, the model claims two distributions 
of evidence, f (x) and f (x). The former distribution 
u m 
denotes the distribution of contextual evidence in regards 
to the modality questioned for distractor items and items 
presented in the study 1 ist but not in the modality ques-
tioned. The latter distribution represents the distribution 
of evidence concerning items presented in the modality 
questioned. Both di~tributions are assumed to be binomial 
with parameters~' the number of possible abstract proposi-
tions regarding modality in memory, and e, the probability 
that a given proposition was formed at the time of study 
list presentation. 
It is further assumed that the subject makes his 
decision as to whether an item was presented in a given 
modality on the basis of the amount of information to that 
effect in memory. Letting a= the probability of associating 
a proposition to an item's lexical node, the distribution 
of evidence available to the subject at the time of test 
for items actually presented in the questioned modality is 
( 1 ) f. (x) = a(f (x)) + (1 - a) (f (x)). 
1 m u 
It may be noted that in practice the non-independent 
36 
d istributions f (x) and f (x) are taken to be unit normal u m 
with means 0 and urn respectively. The distribution f.i(x), 
however, is generally not normal except for those instances 
in which a= 1 (Anderson & Bower, 1972). It is the tests 
of the form of this distribution that permit quantitative 
evaluation of the model by assuming that the distributions 
f (x) and f.(x) serve the same function as do the noise 
U I 
and signal + noise distributions in the theory of signal 
detection. 
Method 
Design. Subjects in the present experiment were 
presented with a I ist of words, half in the auditory (A), 
and half in the visual (V) modality. The subjects were 
divided into six groups depending on whether they were 
g i v en s p e c i f i c or non -spec i f i c i n s t r u c t ions c o.n cern i n g the 
nature of their memory test, and depending on whether they 
solved visually presented arithmetic problems, auditorily 
presented arithmetic problems, or did not engage in dis-
tractor activity. The subjects were tested for recognition 
memory by means of a forced-choice procedure and for memory 
for modality by means of a yes/no procedure. 
Materials and presentation of the study I ist. A 
total of 62 words was used in the experiment: A set of 48 
comprised the experimental items; the remaining 14 items 
were used as primacy and recency buffer items. All items 
were two-syllable nouns occuring between 25 and 50 times 
I. 
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per million as indexed in Thorndike and Lorge (1944). For 
a given subject, 24 of the 48 experimental items were to-
be-remembered items and the remaining 24 were test distractor 
items. Since buffer items were also to-be-remembered items, 
each subject was presented a 1 ist of 38 to-be-remembered 
items. 
Presentation modality was a within-subjects variable. 
Specifically, each subject was presented half of the 24 
to-be-remembered experimental items in the A modality, and 
the remaining half in the V modality. The A words were 
recorded on magnetic tape in a male voice. The V items 
were presented as slides by means of a Kodak Carousel slide 
projector synchronized with the tape recorder. The slides 
appropriate to V presentations were made of dry transfer 
letters mounted on clear plastic and inserted .in slide 
frames. During the time an A word was presented, a blank 
slide was projected. All items were presented at 6 sec. 
intervals. Each A word was spoken once at the beginning of 
the interval comprising the presentation. 
Each experimental item was used equally often a~ross 
subjects as a distractor item in the test-list, and as a 
to-be-remembered item in the study 1 ist. Further, each item 
was presented in the study list equally often in each modal-
ity. Thus, four different study 1 ists were constructed. 
The assignment of the experimental words to the 1 ist posi-
tions was random with the restriction that no more than two 
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items in the same modality were presented consecutively. 
Finally, one-half of the buffer items were pr~sented 
in the A modality, and one-half were presented in the V 
modality. The primacy buffer comprised 4 V and 3 A pre-
sentations, while the recency buffer comprised 3 V and 4 A 
presentations. The same set of buffer items was used in 
all four study lists. 
Presentation of distractor material and instructions. 
Although A and V items were presented at 6 sec. intervals, 
V items were projected for a constant 2.2 sec. The A items 
were spoken once at the beginning of a comparable 2.2 sec. 
interval. During that interval, a blank slide was proj-
ected. Following the intervals comprising item presenta-
tions, an .8 sec. interval elapsed while the projector 
changed s 1 ides. 
Three of the 6 sec. between item presentations have 
been accounted for. The nature of the material presented 
to subjects in the remaining 3 sec. determined the classi-
fication of subjects into three groups. For one group, 
blank slides were presented in these intervals. The 
remaining groups were presented arithmetic classification 
problems in either the A or V modality. The type of 
problem employed was that used by Hopkins, Edwards and 
Cook ( 1973). Specifically, for each problem, one of the 
four signed digits from the pool -1, +1, -2 and +2 was 
presented. When a -1 or a -2 was observed, the subject 
: 
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was instructed to circle an 11 A11 on a response sheet provided 
by the Experimenter. When a +1 or a +2 was detected,. the 
subject was instructed to circle a 11 811 • Once again, since 
the time needed for the projector to change slides was .8 
sec., the problems were actually presented during 2.2 sec. 
intervals. 
Each of the three groups defined above were further 
divided into two groups according to the instructions given 
them prior to the presentation of the study 1 ist. Specifi-
cally, one-half of the subjects were instructed to try and 
remember as many words as they could for a later memory 
test. Thus, the nature of the test was left unspecified. 
The remaining half of the subjects were instructed that it 
might be useful to remember the modality of presentation 
since some of the groups in the experiment wo~ld be asked 
what modality items were presented in. Explicit instruc-
tions concerning the exact nature of the test were not 
given. 
Test procedure. The test 1 ist comprised 24 pairs of 
words typed in a single column on a one page test sheet. 
In each pair was one word previously presented on the study 
list (either an A or V word), and one word not previously 
presented. Subjects were instructed to choose for each 
pair that word which they felt had been presented on the 
study 1 ist. Immediately following each forced-choice 
decision, the subjects were asked to circle a 11 yes'' or 11 no" 
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response to one of two questions as indicated on the test 
sheet. S p e c i f i c a 1 1 y , f o r h a 1 f t he p a i r s , s u b j e c t s we. r e 
asked whether the item chosen from the test pair was pres-
ented in the V ~odal ity, or whether the chosen item was 
presented i n the A mod a 1 i t y i n the study 1 i s t . T h i s res u 1 t-
ed in four types of test pairs which can be identified by 
the combination of input modality (A or V) and modality 
questioned (A or V). An equal number (six) of each of the 
four possible types of test pairs was presented to each 
subject. Finally, subjects were also instructed to circle 
a number from 1 to 5 representing how confident they were 
in their modality judgment. 
Subjects. Subjects were 96 undergraduate volunteers 
from introductory psychology courses at Loyola University. 
There were 16 subjects randomly assigned by or~er of appear-
ance to each of the six experimental groups. 
Results 
Recognition data. As outlined above, forced choice 
r e cog n i t ion d a t a based on 1 2 o b s e r v a t i on s i n each mod a 1 i t y 
were available for each subject. The mean recognition 
probabilities by condition are given in Table 1. As there 
were 16 subjects assigned to each condition, each entry in 
the table is based on 192 observations (16 subjects x 12 
observations). An Analysis of Variance for planned com-
parisons performed on these data indicated that recognition 
performance was higher when subjects were presented the 
Modality 
Condition 
No-Task 
A-Task 
V-Task 
Table 1 
Proportion Correct Recognition 
Instructions 
Intentional Incidental 
A 
.88 
. 85 
.88 
v 
.93 
. 86 
• 9 1 
A 
. 9 3 
.85 
.87 
v 
.92 
.87 
.87 
4 1 
1!, 
I 
I 
study 1 ist without having to perform an interpolated task 
ex= .92) than when subjects engaged in the auditorily 
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(X= .86) or visually (X= .88) presented interpolated 
task, f (1,90) = 9.00, ~ <.01. The difference between the 
latter two conditions was not significant,~ (1,90) = 1.68, 
R <.05. No other main effects or interactions were sig-
nificant. The entire Analysis of Variance is summarized 
in Table 1 of the Appendix. 
Modality judgment performance. A mean error proba-
bility was calculated for each subject conditional upon 
correct recognition. These probabilities are given in 
Table 2. It may be noted that in addition to the nature 
of the interpolated task, nature of instructions, and 
modality of presentation, type of error has been added as 
an additional classification. Specifically, as was out-
1 ined in Chapter Ill, a Miss (M) refers to that type of 
error made when a 11 yes'' response is correct, and a False 
Alarm (FA) refers to that type of error made when a 11 no 11 
response is appropriate. 
An Analysis of Variance indicated that the Modality 
X Error Type interaction differed for those conditions where 
no interpolated task was employed (condition No-task) as 
opposed to where subjects engaged in an aural (A-task) or 
visual (V-task) interpolated task, F (1,90) = 3.96, £. <.05. 
This interaction reflects the fact that the subjects in the 
No-task group had the same M and FA. rates (X= .21) for A 
Modality 
Error Type M 
Condition 
No-Task .25 
A-Task .20 
·V-Task .24 
Table 2 
Mean Error Probabilities by Condition 
Intentional 
A 
FA M 
. 22 . 12 
.30 .32 
.32 .32 
v 
FA 
.29 
.29 
.29 
Instruction 
M 
• 1 8 
.23 
. 25 
!*.!ill-~~;_ :. ~~~~'!'iii. ~-&-t--~~~=-~ ~--
Incidental 
A v 
FA M FA 
.21 .22 .10 
.26 .36 .33 
.29 .23 .34 
~--:-=---'"""'=~~~~=--~~ ---- ---:~~""""'-"==-'.0-~~~~"""' 
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items and approximately equal M and FA rates (X•s = .18 and 
. 1 9 r e s p e c t i v e 1 y ) f o r V i t ems , w h i 1 e s u b j e c t s i n t h e .A - t a s k 
and V-task groups committed more FA's (X= .30) than M's 
(X= .23) for A items with no difference (X 1 s = .31) for 
V items. The comparison between the V-task and A-task 
groups in terms of the Modality X Error Type interaction 
was not significant, f. (1 ,90) = 1.55, £. > .05. 
One further comparison was significant. The lnstruc-
tions X Modality X No-task vs. A-task+ V-task interaction 
was significant, F (1,90) = 4.48, £. < .05. There were a 
greater proportion of errors under the intentional than 
incidental instructions for both modalities in the No-task 
groups with a greater difference (.13) for A items than 
for V items (.04). For the A-task and V-task groups, there 
were a greater proportion of errors under inci~ental in-
structions for A items (X difference = .06) with 1 iteral ly 
no difference under the two instructional conditions for 
V items. The Modality X Instructions interaction was not 
significant for the A-task versus V-task groups comparison 
(f.< 1). There were no other main effects or interact1ons. 
The entire Analysis of Variance is summarized in Table 2 
of the Appendix. 
At the present level of analysis, it appears that the 
11 1 iteral copy 11 or physical code hypothesis is not supported 
by the data in that the predicted interaction between presen-
tat ion modality and modality of interpolated material was 
45 
not obtained. Conceivably, it may be argued that the fail-
ure to obtain the hypothesized effect is due to differential 
response bias between conditions since, as was argued earl-
ier, tnodal ity of presentation and any possible modality bias 
are confounded in the present design. One possible means of 
circumventing this difficulty would be to derive some meas-
ure of modality judgment performance that would obviate 
differential response biases. In order to do so, however, 
it is necessary to develop a quantitative measure of subjects• 
response biases so that each subject's performance scores 
might appropriat~ly be corrected. 
Beta, the signal-detection theory measure of response 
bias, describes the tendency for a subject to say 11 yes 11 as 
opposed to 11 no 11 in relation to his attempts to optimize 
his performance. In terms of the present data, it is 
possible to derive Beta for each modality by treating the 
probability of a subject correctly saying 11 yes 11 when asked 
whether a V item was presented in the V modality as a V 
11 hit 11 , and by treating the probability of a subject saying 
11 yes 11 when asked whether an A item was presented in the V 
modality as a V false-alarm. Consultation of the appropriate 
tables (cf. Hochhaus, 1972) enables a direct computation of 
Beta. 
Underwood (1974) has offered another measure of 
response biases. In particular, Underwood suggested the use 
of the ratio of the difference between the number of M1 s and 
'!! 
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FA•s divided by the sum of the two measures ((M-FA)/(M+FA)) 
as a valid indicant of subject's criterion. As evidence 
for his claim, Underwood reported perfect rank-order 
correlations between the derived measure and Beta. 
Several tests of the viabi 1 ity of the present exten-
sian of Underwood's formulation were made in terms of the 
present data. First, correlations between Beta and the 
(M-FA)/(M+FA) measure were computed based on data gathered 
separately for each modality questioned. Both product-
moment and Spearman rank-order correlations were computed 
(see Table 3). With 14 ~. a product-moment correlation 
of .497 and .623 are required for significance at the .05 
and .01 levels respectively. As can be seen, the present 
values ranged from .58 to .87 with an average of .72. As 
the present distributions of Beta were curvil tnearly related 
to the (M-FA)/(M+FA) measure, these values are somewhat 
conservative. Thus, the Spearman rank-order coefficients 
ranged from .76 to .98 with an average of .91. Hence, it 
may be concluded that the (M-FA)/(M+FA) measure and Beta 
are indices of essentially the same phenomenon. 
A second test of the present conceptualization stems 
from the intuitive observation that a score representing an 
auditory bias should be negatively correlated with a score 
representing a visual bias. In order to test this hypothesis, 
it is necessary to achieve some measure of overall bias that 
is common to both modal itles. One such measure is the 
;; 
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I 
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Tab 1 e 3 
Product Moment Coefficients and Spearman 
,, 
li iii: 
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Rank-Order Coefficients (In Parentheses) 
Instructions 
Intentional Incidental 
Modality A v A v 
Condition 
No-Task .82(.94) .76(.98) .64(.98) .83(.98) 
A-Task .79(.94) .67(.85) .87(.94) .66(.87) 
V-Task .78(.93) .58(.76) .64(.88) .58(.80) 
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(M-FA)/(M+FA) measure computed on data collapsed over the 
two mod a 1 it i es. A subtraction of this measure from the 
(M-FA)/(M+FA) measure computed individually for each modal-
ity questioned should then leave measures of A and V 
response biases which are independent of the overall 
tendency on the part of a subject to say 11 yes 11 as opposed 
to ••no••. These composite measures were, therefore, sub-
sequently computed for each condition. Product-moment 
correlation coefficients, computed on the resultant values, 
are given in Table 4 for each condition. As can be seen, 
the values ranged_ from -.46 to -.89 with an average of -.65. 
All but one of these correlations was significant. Hence, 
the present conceptualization appears to provide at least 
moderately adequate measures of A and V response biases. 
Using the values of the A and V respon~e biases as 
computed above, two further measures were computed for each 
subject. Specifically, a composite measure of modality 
judgment performance was obtained for each subject separately 
for each modality by first obtaining the z-score for each 
subject in each modality in terms of the distribution of all 
192 possible scores (96 subjects X 2 scores). Secondly, 
a z-score for the A and V response bias measures was computed 
separately for each subject based on the appropriate set 
of 96 scores. A total or composite score was then computed 
for each subject by subtracting the z-score for the bias 
measure from the z-score for the error measure. It may 
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Table 4 
Product Moment Correlations Between 
Auditory and Visual Response Bias Measures 
Instructions 
Intentional Incidental 
Condition 
No-Task 
- . 6 1 
-.46 
A-Task 
-. 75 
-.64 
V-Task 
-.89 
-.56 
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thus be noted that this measure, like the probability of an 
error, is negatively correlated with performance. The mean 
of this measure for each group is represented in Table 5. 
An Analysis of Variance indicated that performance was sig-
nificantly higher in the No-task as opposed to the A-task 
and V-task groups,~ (1,90) = ].32, R < .01. No other 
effects or interactions were significant. The entire 
Analysis of Variance is summarized in Table 3 of the 
Appendix. 
One further point is worth noting with respect to the 
results of the a~alysis of the composite scores. Specifi-
cally, the previously reported significant Instructions X 
Modality interaction is apparently not the result of memory 
differences between conditions, but rather is seemingly the 
result of differential response biases. This·follows from 
the fact that the same interaction was not significant when 
considering the composite scores. 
Thus, it appears reasonable to conclude that the 
failure to find an interaction between modality of presen-
tation and modality of interpolated materials was not due 
to a form of response bias that might have masked the pre-
dieted effect. 
Tests of the Anderson and Bower Model 
The mathematical model outlined by Anderson and 
Bower (1972) was described in some detai 1 earlier. The 
reader may recall that words not presented in the modality 
Modality 
Condition 
No-Task 
A-Task 
V-Task 
Table 5 
Mean Composite Scores By Condition 
Instructions 
Intentional Incidental 
A 
-.38 
-. 12 
+. 15 
v 
-. 1 8 
+.23 
+.36 
A v 
-. 14 -.60 
+. 13 +.42 
+. 11 +.02 
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questioned are assumed to be represented by the normal 
distribution f (x), and the words presented in the modality 
u 
questioned are denoted by the non-normal distribution fi (x). 
(see Equation 1). 
The quantitative test employed by Anderson and Bower 
involves computing the probability that a word not presented 
in the modality questioned is given a confidence rating 
exceeding some value~- Each such value is then used to 
provide an estimate of the standard normal deviate corre-
spending to an appropriate criterion on the decision scale. 
A chi-square minimization technique is then used to minimize 
the difference between the obtained and predicted frequency 
of confidence ratings using a, the probability of associa-
ting a proposition to the lexical node in memory, and u , 
m 
the me~n of the distribution of items so associated as free 
parameters. It should thus be noted that the goodness of 
fit test is essentially one concerning the form of the 
distribution. 
This same test was duplicated with the present data. 
As subjects in the present experiment provided confidence 
ratings from 1 to 5 on both yes and no responses, there 
were nine criterion points as described above. However, 
as the number of responses was smal I in some of the con-
fidence rating categories, the 10 categories were combined 
into 5 broader categories resulting in 4 criterion points. 
The-estimates of a and u with the resultant chi-
m 
squares are presented in Table 6. Also presented are the 
results of evaluations of two alternative models: The 
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standard signal detection model which assumes equal variance 
of the noise and signal + noise distributions, and the sig-
nal detection model assuming unequal variances. There is 
one parameter to be estimated in the former case (u, the 
mean of the signal +noise distribution), and two parameters 
in the latter case (u; and cr, the standard deviation of the 
signal + noise distribution). There are 3 degrees of free-
dom for each test of the standard signal detection model 
and 2 degrees of freedom for each test of the other two 
models (5 frequencies - 1 - the number of parameters to 
be estimated). 
The results of the goodness of fit tests indicate 
a moderately good fit for all three models. In all cases, 
there were only 4 out of 12 significant chi-squares at the 
.05 level. It should be noted in this regard that statis-
tical significance is not a very good test of the adequacy 
of a mathematical model. Atkinson, Bower and Crothers 
(1965) have noted that significant chi-squares may be 
expected whenever the number of observations is relatively 
large. Further, the few significant chi-squares reported 
may also be the result of the fact that the chi-square 
estimation procedure gives unequal weight to low p~obabil ity 
events. Also, it should be noted that better fits might be 
o b t a i n e d f o r a 1 1 t h r e e mod e 1 s i f t h·e c r i t e r i on p o i n t s we r e 
Table 6 
Parameter Estimes and Resultant Chi-Square Values 
Standard One-Parameter Two-Parameter Anderson and Bower 
Signal Detection Model Signal Detection Model Model 
Group 
x2 2 x2 x x cr X a )..lm 
No-Task 
Intentional 
Instructions 
A-mode 1. 78 12.86 2.25 1. 74 1. 73 .78 2.46 3.06 
V-mode 1. 7 7 7.45 1. 72 0.94 7.39 1. 00 1. 77 7.45 
lnci dental 
Instructions 
A-mode 1. 90 3.56 2.08 1 . 2 7 1. 85 . 9 3 2.07 2.67 
V-mode 1. 95 12.97 1. 96 1. 02 12.96 .97 2.02 12. 74 
A-Task 
Intentional 
A-mode 1. 32 2. 1 2 1. 34 1. 07 1. 87 .90 1. 47 t. 82 
V-mode 1 . 02 8.53 .98 . 87 7.37 1. 00 1 . 0 2 8.53 Incidental 
A-mode 1. 60 2.52 1. 71 1. 25 . 2 1 .86 1. 89 .04 
V-mode .90 5.65 . 9 1 1. 0 3 5.62 1 . 00 .90 5.65 
V-Task 
Intentional 
A-mode 1 • 1 3 6. 30 1. 42 1. 54 . 05 .68 1 . 9 1 .06 
V-mode 1 . 1 1 .96 1. 11 1. 04 . 91 .99 1 . 1 1 .96 
Incidental 
A-mode 1 . 2 2 2.44 1. 16 .82 .59 1. 00 1 . 2 2 2.43 
V-mode 1. 34 11 . 46 1. 39 1. 21 9.29 .92 1. 45 11 . 30 
V'1 
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also treated as free parameters (e.g., Dorfman & Alf, 1968). 
It is important to note that there is no clear ad-
vantage for any one model. The failure to find a better 
fit for the model proposed by Anderson and Bower (1972) can 
be attributed in part to two specific causes. First, values 
of a close to unity, as were obtained in the present data, 
result in 11 normal-like 11 f.(x) distributions. 
I 
Second, as 
the model actually refers to distributions of evidence 
regarding individual items, the effect of collapsing data 
over subjects and items serves to make the f.(x) distribu-
1 
tion considerably more symmetrical than should ordinarily 
be the case (Anderson & Bower, 1972). Unfortunately, 
therefore, it does not appear that a clear case can be 
made for any one model over another on the basis of the 
present data. 
Discussion 
The failure to find a modality-specific effect of 
interpolated materials upon either recognition memory or 
memory for modality does not fit well with the ''literal 
copy 11 or perceptual code hypothesis. As was out! ined 
earlier in the present chapter, if an image-! ike 1 iteral 
copy is the underlying representation mediating modality 
judgments, then the modality specific encodings of the 
to-be-remembered items would be expected to suffer when 
the modality of the interpolated task was in the same 
modality as the modal lty of item presentation. 
~ ....................... taasc .. ~-~~~. ~"®Q~&-. .................... ~ 
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The reader may recall that both Kirsner {1974) and 
Hintzman and Summers {1973) have argued that modality is 
represented in memory in terms of the actual physical 
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properties of the item. In both studies, superior perform-
ance was obtained in those conditions wherein the original 
item presentation and that item's later test presentation 
were in the same modality. As Kirsner, and Hintzman and 
Summers argued, if such a test by study modality interaction 
were not evident, the results would stand in favor of the 
hypothesis that only the more abstract features of the 
stimulus presentation were important in subjects• recog-
nition decisions. Some resolution of the discrepancy between 
the presently obtained results and the conclusions of 
Kirsner, and Hintzman and Summers would therefore seem to be 
in order. 
One resolution of this difficulty may 1 ie in an exam-
ination of the present procedure. In particular, it may be 
the case that memory/test stimulus comparisons are performed 
on the basis of physical codes of the item only when all the 
various physical codes are available to the subject at the 
time of test. This is to say that subjects might employ 
a physical code to compare test and memory representations 
only when some consistency is maintained between study and 
test modalities. When the distinction between the modal-
ities is not maintained during test list presentation, it 
may be that subjects utilize some a~ternative format of 
................ ~~·~ ............ ~ 
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item representation (i.e., the abstract format) as a basis 
upon which to judge the modality of the initial presenta-
tion. Thus, it may be the case that subjects have avail-
able in memory both an abstract or propositional code 
conveying modality information and a more 11 1 iteral 11 image 
as we 11 . Presumably, the form of the code utilized in 
judging modality would rest on, among other things, the 
nature of the test procedure. 
It may be noted that the proposed solution is not 
altogether unlike that discussed by Anderson (1974) with 
respect to memory for sentences. Anderson was interested 
in whether sentences are maintained only in terms of con-
tent, or semantic features, or whether the exact syntactic 
forms of the sentences are also preserved in memory. 
Anderson presented subjects with a set of sentences to 
study which were either in the active or passive voice. 
Either immediately or following a delay of several minutes, 
the subjects were then required to verify a second sentence 
as to its truth based on the information previously pre-
sented to them. If true, the sentences were either 
identical, or were the same in content but in a different 
voice. Anderson argued that if a verbatin, image-1 ike 
representation of the sentences were stored in memory, then 
an interaction between voice of input and voice of test 
presentation would be found. In two experiments, Anderson 
obtained this interaction with respect to both immediate 
I o 
\, 
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and delayed judgments. The size of the interaction for 
delayed judgments was, however, smaller than for immediate 
judgments. Further, Anderson found that the size of the 
interaction correlated significantly (although modestly, 
r = .39} with memory for the voice of the initial presen-
tation of the sentences. Anderson thus concluded that both 
perceptual and propositional information is maintained 
in memory. 
Such a multiple process view of modality represen-
tation might also be used to explain several other results 
with respect to memory for modality. In both the Kirsner 
(1974}, and Hintzman and Summers (1973} studies, an inter-
action between modality of test presentation and modality 
of study list presentation was obtained only when considering 
recognition data. That is, this interaction was not appar-
ent when considering modality judgment performance. This 
effect might be expected if 11 literal 11 information was used 
in immediate judgmental processes, but higher order abstract 
information was u~ed in the delayed modality judgments. 
This interpretation gains further support from the fact that 
in both the Kirsner, and the Hintzman and Summers studies, 
reaction time data were being recorded which might seemingly 
emphasize to subjects the need to base such immediate judg-
ments upon a I iteral information source. 
A second hypothesis which may also resolve the 
discrepancy between the present results and- the conclusions 
l 
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of Kirsner, and Hintzman and Summers is that the effect of 
the similarity manipulation is the result of some sort of 
encoding facilitation rather than that of a memory compari-
son facilitation process. That is, it may be the case that 
the effect of presenting an item in the same format that it 
was originally presented in during the study 1 ist presenta-
tion facilitates the lexical encoding of the item during 
its subsequent test presentation (Atkinson & Juola, 1974). 
Further, as the effect of the similarity manipulation would 
be on the initial stages of item encoding, modality judg-
ments taken conditionally upon recognition judgments would 
not be expected to be affected by the manipulation. This 
is to say that once the items are recognized, the modality 
judgments would be the result of the retrieval of abstract 
information. 
It may be noted that a similar explanation can be 
used with respect to Anderson 1 s (1974) results. Specifi-
ca11y, the fact that a larger interaction between voice of 
input and test probe voice was obtained in the immediate 
condition than in the delayed condition could be the result 
of a greater encoding faci 1 itation in the former case. 
It should be noted that the 11 encoding 11 hypothesis 
described above thus admits to some form of a perceptual 
code but denies that this perceptual code is representative 
of some type of memory code. Thus, it should be clear that 
e i t h e r t h e n o t i on o f a 11 d u a 1 - r e p r e s-en t a t i on 11 o r a n 11 en cod i n g -
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nfacil itation" hypothesis can explain both the salient 
results of the present experiment and the results obtained 
earlier by Kirsner (1974) and Hintzman and Summers (1973). 
Finally, it should be noted that the failure to find 
an effect of instructions does not support or refute either 
of the alternatives just presented. This failure, however, 
is consistent with the results obtained by Bray and 
Batchelder (1972) and suggests that whatever the nature of 
the code underlying modality judgments, the representation 
is 11 automatically 11 established at the time of an item 
presentation. 
CHAPTER V 
EXPERIMENT I I 
In the present experiment, differences in modality 
information for A and V items were examined as a function 
' 
of retention interval and several characteristics of the 
nature of the materials employed. The specifics and thee-
retical expectations of the experiment are detailed as 
fo 11 ow s. 
Memory for modality ~ ~ function of word charac-
teristics. Both of the hypotheses out! ined in the previous 
chapter suggest that the memory code mediating modality 
judgments is, at least in some cases, abstract or proposi-
tiona1 in nature. One potential difference between the 
propositional form of representation and an image-! ike 
J 
perceptual code is the extent to which subjects would 
I have to process an item presented at the time of test in order to make an appropriate modality judgment. Specifi-
cally, if a subject is to judge the modality of an item on 
the basis of the physical or literal aspects of the item 
presentation, the comparison need not necessarily entail 
I 
1 
accessing any of the lexical properties of the word itself 
(Ki rnser, 1974). If, on the other hand, a more conceptual 
or abstract propositional representation serves as the 
basis for modality judgments, those characteristics which 
might strengthe~ or weaken the memorability of the item as 
a 11 v e r b a 1 11 u n i t m i g h t 1 i k e w i s e b e e.x p e c t e d to a f f e c t t h e 
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memorability of that item's presentation modality. 
One purpose of the present experiment, therefore, 
was to examine memory for modality as a function of two 
widely investigated word characteristics. The first of 
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these can be referred to as background frequency (Underwood, 
Zimmerman & Freund, 1971), or the relative frequency with 
which the item is found in common sources of print (e.g., 
per i o d i c a 1 s) . There a r e a numb e r of s t u d i e s ext an t i n the 
1 iterature (cf. McCormack, 1972) that indicate that recog-
nition performance is higher for those items of low back-
ground frequency than for items of high background frequency. 
Hence, on the basis of the reasoning presented above, it 
may be expected that memory for modality would also be 
superior for low frequency words than for high frequency 
words. 
The second word characteristic to be studied is 
the abstractness of the to-be-remembered words. Atkinson & 
Juola (1973), as well as Gorman (1961) have demonstrated 
that concrete items are recognized better than abstract 
items. Thus, if concrete items are more "memorable'' than 
are abstract words, memory for modality can be expected to 
be greater for concrete than abstract words. 
Memory for modality~~ function~ retention in-
terval. It is not clear as to the length of time modality 
information might be expected to remain as part of a memory. 
As noted earlier, Bray and Batchelder (1972) found no 
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evidence for either differential forgetting of modality 
information for A and V presentations or any decrease in 
overall accuracy of modality judgments over a period of 
15 min. It is, of course, necessary to examine memory 
for modality over a retention interval sufficient to 
demonstrate some loss in judgment accuracy if any hypo-
theses are to be tested concerning the etiology of the 
loss. To that end, subjects in the present experiment 
were tested for memory for modality either immediately 
after presentation of the study list or following a 24 
hour delay. 
Given that some Joss of modality information would 
be expected to occur over a 24 hr. period, the second pur-
pose of the present experiment was to test hypotheses con-
cerning the cause of the forgetting. Two general reasons 
for an expected Joss can be advanced. First, it can be 
suggested that there would be some 11 decay 11 of the modality 
I 
I 
information in memory. A second possibility is that the 
Joss would be due to some form of interference. Evidence 
for the latter possibility is available in the results of 
Hintzman, Block and Inskeep (1972) who compared modality 
judgments for those items recalled on a prior free-recall 
test with items not previously recalled. The results of 
that comparison indicated a positive bias toward responding 
that the previously recalled words .had been presented in 
the V modality. This effect, of course, would be expected 
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if there was some form of interference resulting from the 
modality information formed as a result of the act of 
writing responses during the free-recall portion of the 
experiment. 
The manner in which interference might be expected 
to occur during a 24 hr. delay between study and test might 
be a function of certain characteristics of the subject's 
experience with the to-be-remembered words during that 
interval. More specifically, during the extra-experimental 
portion of the retention interval, the subject would be 
expected to enco~nter some portion of the to-be-remembered 
items in normal conversation and/or reading. Thus, at the 
time of test, subjects 1 memory for input modality might 
be interfered with by his experience with the words during 
the extra-experimental portion of the retention interval. 
If such is the case, it should be possible to influence 
subjects• modality judgments by means of variation in the 
I word pools from which the to-be-remembered items are 
I selected. In particular, it would seem reasonable to suggest that the probability of encountering the to-be-
I 
I 
remembered words during the retention interval is a function 
of the probability of the word being experienced in every-
day usage. Thus, due to less interference, Jess forgetting 
during the retention interval might be expected for low-
frequency as opposed to high frequency words. 
, 
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Method 
Design. The present experiment consisted of present-
ing subjects with a list of words, half in the A modality, 
and half in the V modality. Four basic sets of words were 
employed, representing the factorial combination of high 
and low background frequency with high and low concreteness. 
Following either a 0 or 24 hr. retention interval, subjects 
were tested for recognition memory by means of a forced-
choice procedure and for memory for modality by means of a 
yes/no procedure. 
Word pools. A total of 142 words was used in the 
experiment. One set of 128 words comprised the experimental 
items; the remaining 14 were those items to be used in the 
primacy and recency buffers. The experimental items re-
presented the factorial combination of background frequency 
(high or low) and concreteness (high or low). Thus, there 
were 32 high frequency-low concreteness items, 32 high 
frequency-high concreteness items, 32 low frequency-low 
concreteness item~, and 32 low frequency-high concreteness 
items. High frequency words were defined as those occuring 
at least 50 or more times per million (A and AA), and low 
frequency words were defined as those occuring 15 times 
or less per mill ion in the Thorndike and Lorge (1944) G 
count. High concreteness words were defined as those 
ranging from 5.07 to 7.00 on the seven point scales used 
by Spreen and Schulz (1966) and Paivio, Yuille and Madigan 
, 
1\ 
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(1968). Low concretdo~ss;words were defined as those 
having values of from 1.28 to 2.95. 
Study list constructions and presentation procedure. 
Each subject was presented a single 1 ist of 80 words pres-
ented one time each. The first and last 7 words comprised 
the primacy and recency buffers. These words were not 
represented in the test list. Two sets of 64 words were 
formed from the pool of 128 experimental words previously 
described. For one-half of the subjects, one set of words 
was presented in the study 1 ist while the remaining set of 
words comprised the distractor items to be used in the 
test 1 ist. For the remaining half of the subjects, the 
function of these two sets of words was reversed. 
Of the 64 experimental items presented in the study 
1 ist, 16 were randomly chosen from each set of 32 words 
that represented the four possible combinations of high 
and low frequency and high and low concreteness. Thus, each 
subject was presented 16 high frequency-high concreteness 
items, 16 high frequency-low concreteness items, 16 low 
frequency-low concreteness items, and 16 low frequency-
high concreteness items. 
Modality of presentation was manipulated as in the 
first experiment with all items being presented at a 6 sec. 
rate. The modality in which a particular item was presented 
was counterbalanced across subjects. Thus, four different 
study 1 ists were constructed; each item being used equally 
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often as a distractor item in the test I ist and a to-be-
remembered item in the study list, and equally often in the 
A and V mod a 1 i t i e s . 
The assignment of the experimental words to the 1 ist 
positions was random with two restrictions. First, no more 
than two items in the same modality were presented consecu-
tively. Second, each block of 16 items in the study 1 ist 
comprised two instances of each possible combination of 
mod a 1 i t y (A or V) w i t h 1 eve 1 of f r e que n c y ( h i g h or 1 ow) and 
level of concreteness (high or low). Since there were 64 
items presented in the study 1 ist, there were 4 blocks of 
16 items. 
Manipulation of retention interval. The elapsed 
time between the end of presentation of the study 1 ist and 
the beginning of the test list was varied such that one-
half of the subjects were tested immediately following 
presentation of the study I ist and one-half of the subjects 
were required to return for testing following a 24 hr. 
interval. 
Test pairs. The test 1 ist comprised 64 pairs of 
words. Each pair comprised one word previously presented 
on the study 1 ist and one word not previously presented. 
It will be remembered that there were 64 experimental words 
presented in the study I ist and that there were 8 experi-
mental words for each combination of input modality, back-
ground frequency, and level of con~reten~ss. Each of these 
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items was paired with a distractor item on the test 1 ist. 
Further, each type of word was paired with a distractor 
word that was drawn from the same word source. Thus, for 
example, high frequency-high concreteness to-be-remembered 
items were paired with high frequency-high concreteness 
distractor items. Within the above restrictions, the 
pairings of study and distractor items was randomly deter-
mined. 
Test procedure. The instructions given to the 
subjects and the manner in which the test was administered 
to them was identical to that of the first experiment. 
Subjects. A total of 60 subjects were participants 
in the present experiment. All subjects were required to 
attend two experimental sessions. The data for those 
subjects who did not do so were subsequently not considered 
in the evaluation of the results. Hence, there were 32 
subjects providing usable data, half of whom were tested 
during the first session, and half of whom were tested for 
the first time during a second session following the first 
between 22 and 26 hr. later. All subjects were run and 
tested in groups of size 2-4. 
Results 
Recognition performance. The mean recognition 
probabilities were calculated as in Experiment I. As can 
be seen in Table 7, recognition performance was high for 
the group tested immediately following presentation of the 
Modality 
Immediate 
Group 
Delayed 
Group 
Table 7 
Mean Proportion Correct Recognition 
High Frequency Words 
Abstract Concrete 
A v A v 
.73 . 75 . 80 . 71 
.60 . 64 . 6 3 .65 
Low Frequency Words 
Abstract Concrete 
A v A v 
. 9 1 . 80 . 93 . 86 
• 7 7 .69 . 79 . 70 
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study 1 ist ex= .81) than for the delayed group ex= .69)' 
F (1 ,30) = 166.84, E.< .001, and was higher for low fre-
quency than for high frequency words (X's = .81 and .69 
respectively), f. (1,30) = 29.39, E. <.01. Using the .05 
confidence 1 eve], no other effects or interact ions were 
significant. The entire Analysis of Variance is summarized 
in Table 4 of the Appendix. 
Modality judgments. As in Experiment I, each sub-
ject's data were conditional ized on correct recognition. 
Further, it should be noted that the high versus ]ow fre-
quency comparisons were calculated separately from the 
abstract versus concrete comparisons. That is, the fre-
quency level comparisons were computed collapsed over the 
concreteness-abstractness dimension, and the latter com-
parisons were computed collapsed over the two frequency 
levels. The reason for this particular form of analysis 
was that there were an insufficient number of observations 
per subject upon which an adequate judgment might be made 
with respect to the presence of any interaction between 
the abstractness/concreteness dimension and the background 
frequency dimension. 
High versus low frequency comparisons. As in 
Experiment I, the data were analyzed treating error type 
as a treatment variable in the Analysis of Variance along 
with input modality and frequency as within-subject factors 
and retention interval as a between-subjects factor. 
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The main effect of retention interval, f (1,30) = 
19.29, £. <.01, frequency, f (1,30) = 21.00, £. <.01, and 
error type, f (1,30) = 7.20, £. <.05, were significant. 
As can be seen in Table 8, the latter two effects are the 
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result of a greater proportion of errors for high frequency 
than low frequency words cx•s = .36 and .26 respectively)' 
and a greater proportion of FA's than M's (X's = .35 and 
.27 respectively). No other main effects or interactions 
were significant. The entire Analysis of Variance is sum-
marized in Table 5 of the Appendix. 
As was the case in Experiment I, it is not neces-
sarily clear as to the extent to which these results might 
be the effect of response biases either masking or producing 
differences between conditions. As a general test of the 
adequacy of the measures of response bias developed in 
Chapter IV, the same set of correlations detailed in that 
chapter were computed for the second experiment as well. 
It should be noted that these correlations were computed 
on data collapsed over both the frequency and abstractness-
concreteness dimensions. As was the case in Experiment I, 
the correlations between the (M-FA)/(M+FA) measure and 
Beta computed separately for each modality were high and 
significant, ranging from .81 to .94 with an average of .87. 
The Spearman rank-order correlations were also high, ranging 
from .80 to .93 with an average of .87. Hence, as was the 
case in the previous chapter, it may be concluded that the 
.. 
Immediate 
Group 
A-Mode 
V-Mode 
Delayed 
Group 
A-Mode 
V-Mode 
Table 8 
Mean Probability Error 
High Frequency Words 
Miss 
• 2 7 
• 1 9 
.40 
.35 
False Alarm 
.37 
-35 
.so 
.48 
Low Frequency Words 
Miss 
• 1 8 
• 1 7 
.26 
.36 
Fa 1 s e A 1 arm 
• 1 8 
• 22 
.33 
. 4 1 
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(M-FA)/(M+FA) measure is indicative of the same general 
phenomenon as is the signal detection measure Beta. 
Correlations were also computed between the measures 
of A and V bias obtained by subtracting the (M-FA)/(M+FA) 
measure as computed collapsed over each subject's entire 
data from the same measure computed on the basis of each 
modality questioned. The reader may recall that these 
correlations are predicted to be negative on the grounds 
that any form of A bias would logically seem to be the 
obverse of V bias. As predicted, these correlations were 
highly negative, ~·s = -.96 and -.98 for the immediate and 
delayed groups respectively. Hence, as was argued earlier, 
measures of A and V response biases may be derived that are 
essentially independent of general biases to say "yes" or 
"no". 
Composite scores representing measures free of 
response biases were computed for each subject separately 
for each modality and each level of background frequency. 
These composite scores were derived in the same manner as 
in the first experiment, namely, by subtracting each sub-
ject's ~-score representing his A and V response biases 
from that subject's ~-score representing his A and V error 
rates. The mean composite scores thus computed are presented 
in Table 9. In agreement with the analysis of the uncor-
rected scores, low frequency words were judged correctly 
more often than were high frequency words, F (1,30) = 17.60, 
Immediate 
Group 
Delayed 
Group 
Table 9 
Mean Composite Scores 
High Frequency Words 
A-Mode V-Mode 
+.02 -.02 
+.61 +.79 
Low Frequency Words 
A-Mode V-Mode 
-.62 -.82 
-.07 +. 11 
-· ---· -- --
........ 
~ 
75 
R <.01, and as would be expected, performance was higher 
in the immediate group than in the delayed group,~ (1,30) = 
14.23, £ <.01. No other effects or interactions were sig-
nificant. The entire Analysis of Variance is summarized 
in Table 6 of the Appendix. 
Concrete versus abstract words. Preliminary analyses 
were conducted using error type as a treatment factor. As 
expected, there were no effects significant in this analysis 
that were not significant in the analysis of high versus 
low frequency words. Also, as expected, both the main 
effects of error type,£. (1,30) = 10.20, £ <.01, and reten-
tion interval,£. (1,30) = 24.00, £ <.01 were significant. 
The entire Analysis of Variance is summarized in Table 7 of 
the Appendix. 
Composite scores were computed in the same fashion 
as reported above with the obvious exception that the bias 
scores were computed based on the abstractness/concreteness 
dimension. The mean composite scores are presented by con-
dition in table 11. The only main effect to achieve sig-
nificance was that of retention interval,~ (1,30) = 14.44, 
In addition, the Modality X Retention Interval 
interaction was also significant,~ (1,30) = 5.59, £ <.05. 
This interaction is the result of higher V than A perfor-
mance for the immediate group with the opposite holding 
true for the delayed group. As this comparison was not 
significant in the analysis comparing high and low frequency 
Table 10 
Mean Probability Error 
Abstract Words 
Miss False Alarm 
Immediate 
Group 
A-Mode 
.27 .33 
V-Mode • 1 9 . 31 
De 1 ayed 
Group 
A-Mode • 3 1 .40 
V-Mode 
.37 .43 
Concrete Words 
Miss Fa 1 s e A 1 arm 
. 16 . 2 1 
. 1 7 . 2 3 
.29 • 4 5 
• 3 4 .46 
'-1 
"' 
1 
Table 11 
Mean Composite Scores 
Abstract Words 
A-Mode V-Mode 
Immediate 
-. 0 8 -.36 Group 
De 1 ayed +.28 +.45 Group 
6-~---
Concrete Words 
A-Mode V-Mode 
-.04 -.72 
+.08 +.76 
........ 
........ 
1 
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words, and is only marginally significant in the present 
analysis, there does not seem to be any justifiable inter-
pretation. The entire Analysis of Variance is summarized 
in Table 8 of the Appendix. 
A Mathematical Model 
The results of a series of goodness of fit tests 
with respect to the mathematical model developed by Anderson 
and Bower (1972) were reported in the previous chapter. The 
reader may recall that the results of the tests did not 
permit a distinction between the Anderson and Bower model 
and two alternative signal detection models. The failure 
to find clear empirical support for the Anderson and Bower 
model does not necessarily indicate that the concept of a 
prepositionally based memory structure is innacurate, but 
rather; suggests that the specifics of the model are insuf-
ficient to describe the data. Thus, one purpose of the 
present section is to describe a variant of the model pro-
posed by Anderson and Bower and to compare the two formu-
lations in terms of their goodness of fit to the data from 
Experiment I I. 
The distinction between the presently proposed model 
and that offered by Anderson and Bower 1 ies in the manner in 
which subjects process information not directly referred to 
in the task instructions. With respect to the present ex-
periments, for example, the Anderson and Bower model sug-
gests that .all distractor items and items presented in the 
r 
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modality not questioned are denoted by the same distribution. 
This implies that when subjects are asked whether a V item 
was presented in the A mode, subjects attempt to retrieve 
only information that is relevant to the item having been 
presented in the A modality. Common sense, however, would 
seem to suggest that subjects might often answer such a 
question through the retrieval of information that the item 
was presented in the V mode. The purpose of the present 
section of this chapter, then, is to describe a model which 
directly takes such an observation into account. 
It would thus seem inappropriate to treat distractor 
items as being distributed identically to items not pre-
sen ted i n the mod a l i t y que s t ion e d . M o r e spec i f i c a 1 I y , the 
present model suggests that it is appropriate to treat the 
data from the present experiments as being represented by 
three distributions, one representing A items, one repre-
senting V items, and a third representing distractor items. 
These three distributions can be considered to 1 ie along 
a single dimension that may be 1 ikened to an Auditory-
Visual scale; one end of the continuum represents a visual 
end-state (Gardner, 1973), and the other end of the con-
tinuum represents an auditory end state. The three dis-
tributions are assumed to based on the parameters a and u 
m 
as in the Anderson and Bower model. Further, in line with 
Anderson and Bower (1973), it is assumed that when asked 
a particular question, an initial representation of that 
p 
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question is formed in a propositional format, and a match 
for the resulting representation is sought in memory. 
The nature of the likelihood distributions on the 
decision scale, however, depend on both the distributions 
described above, and also on the probability that a subject 
will test alternative propositions to that indicated by the 
questions asked of tehm. Thus, for example, the shape of 
the 1 ikel ihood distribution of V items on an A 1 ikel ihood 
scale, f (x), is a function of the distribution of evi-
v.a 
dence for V items on the Auditory-Visual scale and also 
on the probab i 1 i ty A , that a subject wi 11 test propositions 
- v 
concerning the V modality when asked about the auditory 
modality, or 
( 2) f (x) = Av f (x) + ( 1 - A ) f (x). 
v.a v v n 
It should be noted that f (x) and f (x) represent the dis-
v n 
tributions of V and distractor items on the Auditory-
Visual scale. The equation is based on the observation 
that if subjects did not check their memory as to whether 
a V item was presented visually, the V item so tested 
would have the same likelihood of having been presented 
auditorily as a distractor item falsely recognized. Simi-
larly, the likelihood distribution of A items on the V 
1 ike 1 i hood s ca 1 e is 
8 1 
(3) f (x) = A f (x) + (1 - A ) f (x). 
a.v a a a n 
A simple test of this alternative model can be con-
ducted in a manner similar to that of Experiment I. Confi-
dence ratings were grouped into five categories and the 
four criteria separating the categories were determined by 
calculating the standard normal deviates as reported in the 
previous chapter. A chi-square minimization technique was 
used to find the best fitting parameters for the signal 
distribution. The present case differs from that reported 
in the previous chapter in that these criterion estimates 
were based on the distribution of confidence ratings to the 
i terns not pres en ted in the mod a 1 i ty questioned. 
Both the signal-detection model parameter estimates 
and the Anderson and Bower model parameter estimates are 
presented in Table 12. Clearly, the one parameter signal 
detection model does not describe the data very well. 
Further, similar to the results of the first experiment, 
both the two para~eter signal detection model and the 
Anderson and Bower model fit the data fairly well. There 
are no significant chi-squares at the .05 level for either 
model. Also, however, there is ·a small but consistent 
superiority of the two parameter signal detection model 
over the Anderson and Bower model. 
The second part of the test of the present model 
relates to the shape of the distribution of·the V items on 
Parameter Estimates 
Standard One-Parameter 
Signal Detection Model 
Group x 2 X 
Immediate 
Mode 
H i Frequency A .59 45.95 
Hi Frequency V .99 28.54 
Lo Frequency A . 85 58.66 
Lo Frequency V 1.03 56.12 
Del a~ 
H i Frequency A .23 8.37 
Hi Frequency V . 38 4.85 
Lo Frequency A . 80 4. 1 3 
Lo Frequency V . 42 16.94 
Table 1 2 
and Resultant Chi-Square Values 
Two-Parameter 
Signal Detection Model 
X C1 2 X 
1. 21 2.03 1. 42 
1. 43 1. 65 4.43 
1. 97 2.23 0. 1 7 
2.02 2. 1 7 .59 
.29 1. 35 2. 1 3 
.42 1. 24 1. 22 
.95 1 . 28 .35 
.56 1. 52 1. 65 
Anderson and Bower 
Model 
a ll 
.44 4. 1 0 
.59 2.26 
.59 3.40 
. 6 3 2.75 
. 1 9 2.23 
.29 1. 53 
. 61 1 . 52 
. 32 1. 94 
xz 
5.78 
5.08 
4. 79 
3.35 
3. 71 
1. 4 7 
.24 
5. 1 3 
00 
N 
1 
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the A 1 ikel ihood scale, the A distribution on the V 1 ikel i-
hood scale. The model outlined by Anderson and Bower pre-
dicts that these distributions will have the same mean and 
variance (0,1) as the likelihood distribution of distractor 
items. The chi-square tests appropriate to the Anderson 
and Bower model each have four degrees of freedom and are 
summarized in the first column of Table 13. The alternative 
mode 1 out 1 i ned above s u g g e s t s that the 1 i k e 1 i hood d i s t r i -
bution of A items on the V likelihood scale will have the 
same variance and mean (but opposite in sign) as the 
1 ikel ihood distribution of A items on the A 1 ikel ihood 
scale. A similar case can be made for V items. The result-
ant chi-squares each have three degrees of freedom due to 
the Joss of one degree of freedom through the estimation of 
the parameter A. The results of these tests are clear. 
There is a clear superiority for the general type of model 
out 1 i ned above. 
The results of the tests are equivocal, however, 
with respect to an absolute test of the overall model. 
Certainly, however, lower chi-squares would be obtained if 
both likelihood distributions of a particular modality were 
fit to the data simultaneously. Unfortunately, however, 
the additional computer time to make such a test would be 
hundreds of times greater than was needed to obtain the 
paramet~r estimates in the present fashion. 
It is interesting to note that the model fits the 
Condition 
Immediate 
Hi Frequency A 
H i Frequency V 
Lo Frequency A 
Lo Frequency v 
De I aye d 
H i Frequency A 
H i Frequency v 
Lo Frequency A 
Lo Frequency V 
Table 1 3 
Chi-Square Values for Two Alternative Models 
Anderson and Bower Model Proposed Model 
2 
A x2 X 
213.89 
. 9 7 10.68 
113.54 
.76 24.09 
358.90 
.94 5.84 
268.27 
. 9 7 3.65 
3 . 31 .02 4.61 
34.29 
.77 27.20 
13.24 
.69 1. 16 
53.36 
. 6 7 12.24 
(X) 
.s::-
1 
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data for the low frequency words much more accurately than 
it fits the data for the high frequency words. This result 
may be attributed to the fact that high frequency words 
have, in general, a greater number of senses than do low 
frequency words (Reder, Anderson & Bjork, 1974), and hence, 
are more subject to encoding failures (Anderson & Bower, 
1974). 
In sum, then, the present results strongly imply 
that subjects access representations in memory other than 
those required by the question asked of them by the experi-
menter. The conditions under which this question answering 
might be shown to vary remains to be specified. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment I I indicate that memory 
for mod a 1 i t y i s i n f 1 u en c e d by at 1 e as t one c h a r act e r i s t i c 
of the stimulus materials. Specifically, memory for modal-
ity is clearly superior for low frequency words than for 
high frequency words. As was pointed out by Kirsner (1974), 
if a literal copy, or perceptual code is the basis for 
subjects 1 modality judgments, the retrieval of the infor-
mation in that code should be independent of any of the 
properties of that item which characterize its lexical 
status in memory. Landauer and Streeter (1973), however, 
have shown that low frequency words are more "different" 
from other low frequency words than high frequency words 
are different from other high freq~ency words. More speclfi-
jiP 
86 
cally, these authors demonstrated that high frequency words 
are more similar to other high frequency words on both the 
graphemic and phonemic dimensions than are low frequency 
words to other low frequency words. Given the results of 
Experiment I, it appears unlikely that the graphemic and 
phonemic word characteristics could differentially affect 
the quality of an "image". Specifically, there are a 
number of studies extant in the 1 iterature that have 
demonstrated a superiority of phonemic as opposed to 
graphemic memory codes (cf. Posner & Warren, 1972). Thus, 
if memory for modality for V items is dependent upon memory 
for graphemic codes, while memory for modality for A items 
is dependent upon phonemic codes, an advantage would be 
expected for A as opposed to V items. That this result 
was not obtained in either of the present experiments or 
in any of the experiments previously reported in the 1 it-
erature would seemingly case doubt on a hypothesis attri-
buting memory for modality to the retention of the graphemic 
and phonemic codes per ~· 
The failure to find an effect of the abstract/ 
concrete dimension on either recognition memory or memory 
for modality is surprising, particularly in the 1 ight of 
the results obtained by Gorman (1961). There does not 
seem to be any immediate explanation for this discrepancy. 
The mechanism responsible for the forgetting of 
modality information is not readily apparent. The hypo-
I 
, 
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thesis outlined earlier which suggested that forgetting 
should be inversely related to frequency of word usage is 
clearly not supported in the present data. Thus, the most 
parsimonious explanation of forgetting of modality infor-
mat ion may simply be one of ••trace decay•• (Wickelgren, 1972). 
It is interesting to note, however, that the present 
res u 1 t s demons t r a t e a subs tan t i a 1 memory for mod a 1 i t y even 
following a 24 hr. delay. 
In sum, the results of the present experiment seem-
ingly support the notion that an abstract representation 
of modality serves as the basis upon which subjects judge 
modality of presentation. At the same time, however, one 
specific model of the abstract representation, that offered 
by Anderson and Bower (1972) is not supported by the data. 
Integration ~Experiments land _1_1 
The results of the two experiments are consistent 
with the notion that the memory representation of modality 
information is at least in part abstract or propositional 
in nature. The reader may recall that either of two 
general hypotheses can account for both the salient results 
of the present experiments and those previously reported 
in the 1 iterature. Specifically, it was suggested that 
either a 11 dual-representation 11 hypothesis or an 11 encoding-
facilitation•• hypothesis can account for the present data 
and the results of the Kirsner (1974) and Hintzman and 
Summers (1973) studies. 
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The key distinction between the encoding facilitation 
hypothesis and the dual-representation hypothesis 1 ies in 
the manner in which the hypotheses account for the failure 
to find an effect of the similarity manipulation on modality 
judgments. The encoding facilitation hypothesis accounts 
for this failure on the basis of the fact that while modal-
ity judgments are based on the retrieval of abstract infer-
mation, presenting an item in the same physical format on 
both study and test occasions results in the facilitation 
in the lexical encoding of the item at the time of test. 
That is, given recognition (and therefore, presumably, 
encoding of the item), modality judgments are not expected 
to be affected by the similarity manipulation. 
The dual-representation hypothesis, on the other 
hand, suggests that both perceptual codes and abstract 
propositions may form the basis of modality judgments; the 
representation utilized by subjects depending in part on 
the nature of the task. The dual-representation hypothesis, 
of course, is so~ewhat difficult to test since any failure 
to find an effect of a manipulation such as that employed 
in Experiment I is handled by resorting to the explanation 
; 
. that an abstract code was utilized in that instance . 
Recent evidence offered by Kirsner and Smith (1974), 
however, would seem to favor the dual-representation hypo-
thesis. In that study, a word identification paradigm was 
employed where subjects were shown a series-of words and 
L----------------... 
jiiiP 
89 
non-words and were asked to classify each item as to whether 
or not it was in fact a word. Each item was presented 
twice. Further, the physical format of the stimuli was 
either the same or different on both presentation occasions. 
The results indicated that the time for item identification 
was faster when the physical formats were the same on both 
occasions as opposed to when they were different. Moreover, 
this effect was of approximately the same magnitude for 
both words and non-words. The Kirsner and Smith results 
may thus be taken as evidence for the dual representation 
hypothesis since if the effect was due to the process of 
activating the item in the lexicon, the effect of the 
similarity manipulation would not be expected for non-words. 
Thus, the results of the Kirsner and Smith study taken in 
conjunction'with the results of the present experiments 
would seem to argue in favor of a dual-representation 
notion. 
Finally, it is tempting to speculate that the per-
ceptual code that is sometimes available to subjects is an 
image-1 ike entity involving the auditory and visual 
perceptual systems. There remains, however, a number of 
difficulties with this conceptualization. Specifically, 
recent arguments offered by Baylor (1972) and Pylyshlyn 
(1973) suggest that the representation of the "image" 
itself is prop~sitional or abstract in nature. These 
arguments have proceeded on the gro-unds that images are 
90 
explicable in terms of certain network models where images 
are functional or procedural representations of the envi-
ronment (e.g., Winograd, 1972). Thus, the introspective 
experience of an 11 image'' does not constitute evidence of 
a perceptual system being involved except to the extent 
that a basic procedural representation, which itself 
cannot be open to introspect ion, underlies both the image 
in the 11 mind's eye 11 and the image arising through the 
act of perception. Thus, the image may refer to nothing 
more than a particular abstract form of representation 
common to both memorial and perceptual systems. 
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Table 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for 
Recognition Data (Experiment 1 ) 
Source ss df MS F 
Total 2. 0 1 1 9 1 
Subjects 1. 12 95 
Instructions 
.00 .00 .00 ( Ins) 
Interpolated . 1 2 2 . 06 5. 3 5 
Materials 
( In t) 
Ins X In t .02 2 • 0 1 .90 
Ss 
-
w/g roups . 9 8 90 . 0 1 
Modality (M) . 0 1 . 0 1 1 . 4 4 
M X Ins . 0 1 . 0 1 1. 44 
M X lnt .00 2 .00 .00 
M X lnt X Ins .02 2 • 0 1 .88 
M X ~s/grps . 85 90 .009 
1 0 1 
Table 2 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for 
Error Data (Experiment 1 ) 
Source ss df MS F 
Total 2 0. 1 0 383 
Subjects (.?_s) 6.38 95 
Instructions (Ins) .02 .02 . 3 4 
Interpolated 
.64 2 .32 5.33 Materials ( In t) 
Ins X lnt .06 2 .03 . 91 
Ss w/g roups 5.66 90 .06 
Modality (M) .02 .02 . 3 3 
M X Ins . 0 1 . 0 1 . 1 7 
M X lnt .05 2 .03 .so 
M X Ins X lnt .30 2 . 1 5 2.67 
M X Ss w/g rps 5.53 90 .06 
-
Error Type (E) .06 .06 1 . 20 
E X Ins .02 .02 .40 
E X In t .02 2 . 0 1 .20 
E X Ins X tnt . 1 0 2 .05 1 . 00 
E X ~s/groups 4.06 90 .05 
M X E .04 .04 1. 00 
M X E X Ins .00 .00 .00 
M X E X lnt .20 2 . 1 0 4.00 
M X E X Ins X tnt . 0 1 2 . 0 1 .03 
M X E X ~s/g roups 3.25 90 .04 
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Table 3 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for 
Recognition Data (Experiment 1 ) 
Source ss df MS F 
Total 1 79.9 7 19 1 
Subjects 139.76 95 
Instructions .02 (Ins) .02 . 0 1 
Interpolated 10.40 2 5.2 3.67 Materials 
(In t) 
Ins X In t 1. 50 2 . 75 .53 
Ss w/groups 127.83 90 1. 42 
-
Modality (M) 
.34 .34 . 83 
M X Ins 1. 39 1. 39 3.45 
M X lnt 1. 62 2 . 8 1 2.03 
M X Ins X lnt .73 2 . 37 .92 
Ss w/g rp X M 36. 1 3 90 .40 
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Table 4 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for 
Recognition Data (Experiment 2) 
Source ss df MS F 
Total 8.45 
Subjects (Ss) 1. 19 31 
Retention 1. 01 1. 01 166.84 Interval ( R) 
Ss w/groups . 1 8 30 .006 
-
Frequency (F) .89 . 89 29.39 
R X F • 0 1 • 0 1 .33 
F X ~s/grps . 9 1 30 .03 
Modality (M) . 1 2 . 12 3.00 
R X M .02 .02 .so 
M X ~s/grps 1. 16 30 .04 
Abstractness (A) .03 .03 1 . 00 
R X A .00 .00 .00 
A X Ss/g rps • 9 1 30 .03 
A X M ~ 0 1 . 0 1 .so 
R X A X M .00 .00 .00 
A X M X ~s/grps . 70 30 .02 
A X F .00 .00 .00 
R X A X F .00 .00 .00 
A X F X Ss/grps • 72 30 .02 
F X A X M .02 .02 .67 
R X F X A X M .02 .02 .67 
A X F X M X ~s/grp .]6 30 .03 
l 
r-
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Table 5 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for 
Error Data (Experiment 2) 
Source ss df MS F 
Total 14.46 255 
Subjects (~s) 3.40 31 
Retention 1. 35 1. 35 19. 29 Interval ( R) 
~s w/groups 2.05 30 .07 
F req uen cy (F) .63 .63 21 . 00 
R X F .00 .00 .00 
F X ~s/grps 0 9 7 30 .03 
Modality (M) .00 .00 .00 
R X M .03 .03 .38 
M X ~s/grpso 2.53 30 .08 
Error Type (E) .43 0 4 3 .72 
R X E oOO .00 .00 
E X .?_s/g rps l. 80 30 .06 
F X M . 1 3 . 13 3.25 
R X F X M .02 .02 .so 
F X M X Ss/grpso 1. 28 30 .04 
E X F .07 .07 1. 75 
R X E X F .03 . 03 . 75 
E X F X .?_s/grps. 1. 05 30 .04 
E X M . 0 1 . 0 1 .33 
R X E X M . 0 1 . 01 . 3 3 
E X M X .?_s/g rps 0 .78 30. .03 
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Table 5 (con•t.) 
Source ss df MS -F 
E X F X M .03 .03 . 75 
R X E X F X M . 0 1 .07 1. 75 
E X F X M X 1. 19 30 .04 Ss w/g roups 
r 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for 
Composite Scores (Experiment 2) 
Source ss df MS F 
Total 127.42 127 
Subjects (~s) 51 . 6 7 31 
Retention 
Interval ( R) 16. 6 5 16.65 14.2 3 
Ss 
-
w/g roups 35.02 30 1. 1 7 
Frequency 15.84 15. 84 17.60 
R X F . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 
F X .?_s/g rps. 26.86 30 .90 
Modality (M) .02 .02 . 0 3 
R X M .67 . 6 7 1 . 0 3 
M X Ss/grps. 19.62 30 . 6 5 
M X F .05 .05 . 1 2 
R X M X F .05 . 0 5 . 1 2 
M X F X ~s/grps. 1 2. 6 3 30 .42 
r 
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Table 7 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for 
Error Data (Experiment 2) 
Source ss df MS F 
Total 14.74 255 
Subjects (~s) 3.38 31 
Retention 
1. 44 1 1. 44 24.00 Interval ( R) 
Ss 
-
w/g roups 1. 94 30 .06 
Abstractness (A) . 1 0 . 1 0 2.50 
R X A . l 3 . 1 3 3.25 
A X ~s/grps. 1. 05 30 .04 
Modality . 0 1 . 0 1 . 1 0 
R X M .05 .05 .so 
M X ~s/grps. 2.92 30 . 1 0 
Error Type (E) . 51 . 51 10.20 
.. i 
R X E .02 .02 .40 
E X ~s/grps 1. 51 30 .05 
A X M . 0 1 . 0 1 . 1 6 
R X A X M .02 .02 . 3 3 
A X M X ~s/grps 1. 75 30 .06 
E X A .00 .00 .00 
R X E X A .04 1 .04 .80 
E X A X ~s/grps. 1. 38 30 .os 
E X M .00 .00 .00 II 
i I 
I 
R X E X M .02 .02 .67 
E X M X ~s/grps. .99 30· .03 
:I 
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Table 7 (con't.) 
Source ss df MS F. 
E X A X M . 0 1 • 0 1 .33 
R X E X A X M .00 .00 .00 
E X A X M X 
Ss w/groups • 84 30 .03 
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Table 8 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for 
Composite Scores (Experiment 2) 
Source ss df MS F 
Total 124.49 127 
Subjects 61 . 90 3 1 
Retention 20.07 20.07 14.44 Interval ( R) 
Ss w/groups 41 . 83 30 1. 39 
-
Modality (M) . 1 6 . 16 .22 
R X M 4.03 4.03 5.59 
M X ~s/grps. 21 . 68 30 . 72 
Abstractness (A) . 71 . 71 .83 
R X A 1. 37 1. 37 1 . 59 
A X ~s/grps. 25.88 30 .86 
M X A . 51 . 51 . 1 . 9 6 
R X M X A .sa .58 2.23 
M X A X ~s/grps. 7.67 30 .26 
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